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Taxing Parents: Welfarist Theories 
Shannon Weeks McCormack* 
The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) taxes parents 
inequitably. Couples with a sole earner are undertaxed compared 
to couples with dual earners and to single parents. Legal tax 
scholarship (including my own) has identified the many inequities 
that result from this sole-earner bias and have called for its 
elimination. But while these arguments have been sufficient for 
some, they do remain susceptible to the criticism that they are 
theoretically incomplete.   
That critique might proceed as follows. Simply establishing that 
an inequity exists does not create a full argument for legal reform. 
After all, it might be argued, the Code plays favorites all the time. 
To evaluate whether tax preferences are warranted, scholars have 
traditionally turned to theories of distributive justice. These 
theories offer competing visions about the way resources should be 
allocated. Rather than advocating blanket equality, these theories 
identify higher order principles that justify preferentialism. But, 
critics might argue, scholars who have asked Congress to eliminate 
the Code’s preference for sole earners have often failed to connect 
their arguments with this distributive literature. 
This Article, the first in a series, begins to respond to this 
potential criticism by connecting traditional theories of 
distributive justice with the debate surrounding the Code’s 
inequitable taxation of parents. To do so, I focus on welfarist 
theories—a body of distributive theories that seek to maximize 
social welfare—because of the dominant influence they have 
exerted over tax debates. It shows why welfarism, and in 
particular utilitarianism, may sometimes support the Code’s  
sole-earner bias despite the inequities it creates. And it shows how, 
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Law. Many thanks to Larry Zelenak, Sarah Lawsky, the participants at the University of 
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Thank you also to Cynthia Fester and Alaura Valley for valuable research assistance.  
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more generally, it may favor parents who have relatively 
expansive opportunity sets and are, therefore, better positioned to 
use their income to achieve well-being than other parents with 
fewer choices. 
Some will find these prescriptions counterintuitive and even 
troubling. For them, the analysis may reveal the limitations of 
relying too heavily on welfarism to analyze the taxation of parents. 
Recognizing this, I conclude by identifying other non-welfarist 
theories that have received less attention in the legal tax 
scholarship and discussing how they could expand conversations 
about how parents should be taxed relative to one another. 
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How should parents be taxed relative to one another? Should, 
for instance, single parents receive tax benefits that two-parent 
families do not? Between two-parent families, should dual- and 
sole-earners be differentiated? More generally, when two families 
are similarly situated—i.e., when they earn the same taxable 
income and provide care to the same number of dependent 
children—should it matter for tax purposes if they employ different 
parenting models? While much has been written about the taxation 
of the family,1 the answers to these seemingly basic questions 
remain undertheorized in the legal tax literature.   
To be clear, it is now well recognized that the Internal Revenue 
Code (the “Code”) taxes parents inequitably, undertaxing sole-
earner couples relative to dual earners and single parents.2 For 
example, because the Code allows only limited recovery of 
childcare expenses, it often favors sole earners (who do not 
typically have to incur these costs) at the expense of other parents 
(who generally will).3 Legal tax scholarship, including my own,  has 
identified the many inequities that result from this sole-earner bias. 
In particular, scholars have carefully described how this 
congressional favoritism is gendered,4 classed,5 raced,6 and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Income Tax and the Costs of Earning a Living, 56 TAX 
L. REV. 39 (2002); Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress’s 1981 Response to 
the “Marriage Penalty” Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468, 469, 475–84 (1983); Grace Blumberg, 
Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 
BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle 
Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2016) [hereinafter Weeks McCormack, 
Overtaxing the Working Family]; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996). 
 2. See, e.g., Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 1; 
Blumberg, supra note 1; see also infra Part I (discussing how sole earners are undertaxed 
relative to dual- and single-earner parents). 
 3. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 1; Gann, supra note 1. 
 4. See, e.g., Edward McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, 
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993) (discussing incomplete markets 
in America); Blumberg, supra note 1; Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and 
the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323 (2017) [hereinafter Weeks McCormack, Postpartum 
Taxation]; Staudt, supra note 1. 
 5. Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 755 (2005); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The 
Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997). 
 6. See sources cited supra note 5. 
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heteronormative.7 In light of this, scholars have generally called for 
the elimination of the Code’s preference for sole earners.   
For some (including myself) these arguments have been more 
than convincing. At the same time, they remain susceptible to the 
criticism that they are theoretically incomplete. That critique might 
proceed as follows. The tax laws are littered with tax preferences 
and incentives that purposefully result in non-uniform (that is, 
unequal) taxation. For instance, the Code taxes capital gains from 
the sale of assets differently than wages earned through labor.8 It 
taxes wages earned by independent contractors differently than 
those earned by employees.9 Even something as fundamental as the 
Code’s progressive rate structure, in which tax rates increase with 
income, results in unequal treatment among taxpayers. In other 
words, the Code plays favorites all the time.   
To evaluate whether a particular tax preference is warranted, 
legal tax scholars have generally turned to distributive theories  
of justice, which offer competing frameworks to determine  
how society’s resources should be allocated.10 Far from  
advocating blanket equality, these varied theories identify higher 
order goals that justify unequal taxation and preferentialism.  
And it is the content of these higher order goals around which 
(often vehement) debate centers. To provide a few examples, 
adherents of welfarism (the focus of this Article would distribute 
resources in whatever way maximizes overall social welfare 
(discussed more in Part II), regardless of what preferences result.11 
Optimal tax theorists prescribe unequal taxation to achieve the dual 
goals of maximizing social welfare and minimizing behavioral 
distortions.12 And resource egalitarians tolerate inequality so long 
 
 7. Anthony Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing 
in the United States, 3 UTAH L. REV. 605, 605 (2010) (identifying the discriminatory aspects of 
relying on federal marriage, which results in the “privileg[ing of] the so-called traditional, 
nuclear family over all other family arrangements”). 
 8. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d), (h) (2012). 
 9. I.R.C. § 199A (2018). 
 10. See infra Section I.C. 
 11. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS  
359 (2008). 
 12. See, e.g., J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971); N. Gregory Mankiw, Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, 
Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
15071, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w15071.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT7U-WEUD] 
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as it is not caused by bad luck entirely outside of one’s control 
(“brute luck”).13   
Legal tax scholars have invoked these and other theories to 
assess the wisdom of all sorts of tax preferences.14 However, critics 
might argue, scholars who have argued for the elimination of the 
Code’s sole-earner bias have often failed to explicitly link their 
arguments with this distributive tax literature. 
In this Article, the first part of a series of projects, I seek to 
respond to these potential criticisms by drawing the theoretical 
connections that some may find lacking. I hope that these projects 
will not only create a more complete conversation about how 
parents should be taxed but also draw more voices into the debate. 
In this particular Article, I focus on welfarist theories because of the 
clear dominance they have exerted over distributive debates in 
legal tax scholarship.15 Other distributive theories will be discussed 
in companion work. 16   
 
(“The standard theory of optimal taxation posits that a tax system should be chosen to 
maximize a social welfare function subject to a set of constraints. The literature on optimal 
taxation typically treats the social planner as a utilitarian . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 73 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (making differentiation between brute and option 
luck); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 601, 625 (2011) (“Most liberal egalitarians . . . tolerate unequal outcomes due to 
choices, but not unequal outcomes due to chance.”). 
 14. For instance, a rich line of scholarship has asked how well the Code’s progressive 
rate structure accomplishes the welfarist aim of maximizing overall social welfare. See, e.g., 
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at 
Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1915–17 (1987). 
 15. See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 904, 910 (2011) (welfarist theories have predominated tax discourse for 
decades); see also id. at 911 n.21 (citing numerous sources describing welfarism’s dominance 
in tax literature); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 229, 239–40 (2011) (“[Welfarist theories] have had the upper hand in the tax policy 
literature for quite some time because their arguments sound in [both] fairness and 
efficiency, and resonate as [both] specific and determinative.”); Anne L. Alstott, Equal 
Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 474–75 (2007) (explaining that 
welfarism has “dominated normative legal analysis in the last generation” by offering 
“intellectual rigor” and rejecting the use of “ad hoc norms”). 
 16. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents: Resource and Luck 
Egalitarianism (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author); Shannon Weeks 
McCormack, Taxing Parents: Welfarism and Other-Regarding Preferences (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents: Equality 
of Opportunity Approaches (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author); Shannon 
Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents: A New Theoretical Approach (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author). 
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The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly discuss the 
Code’s historic favoritism of sole earners and how the recently 
enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reinforced this bias. I next discuss 
the work of legal tax scholars who have urged Congress  
to eliminate these preferences and show that their ideas have not 
always been fully linked to the distributive theories most 
frequently invoked by scholars to analyze the wisdom of  
tax preferences.   
To begin to make these connections, I turn in Part II to welfarist 
theories, which have dominated distributive tax debates, and ask 
how they may contribute to conversations about the way parents 
should be taxed. When employing the welfarist lens to evaluate the 
tax laws, legal scholars often begin with—if not focus entirely on—
utilitarianism,17 one particular type of welfarism. And when 
applying utilitarianism, these scholars often assume that 
individuals enjoy the same utility from a given level of income and 
that utility of income declines as income increases.18 I show that 
when these simplifying assumptions are maintained, utilitarianism 
appears to strengthen the case for eliminating the Code’s sole-
earner bias and may even suggest that dual earners and single 
parents receive special benefits. 
In Part III, however, I show why it is unrealistic to make these 
assumptions when comparing parenting models. First, individuals 
using different parenting models will not have the same choices 
(i.e., opportunity sets) just because they have the same income. And 
relatedly, the extent to which income can be expected to serve as a 
sound proxy for utility will differ depending on the parenting 
model used. I then conclude that, once assumptions are relaxed, 
utilitarianism may sometimes justify the Code’s favoritism for sole 
earners and may, more generally, prescribe transfers to parents 
who have more expansive opportunity sets and/or who are better 
positioned to use their income to enhance well-being. In the process 
of making these observations, which some will find 
counterintuitive or even troubling, I identify potential limitations 
of relying too heavily on welfarism to analyze questions about the 
taxation of parents, situate the discussion within the larger  
 
 17. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: Problems and 
Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485, 1487 n.8 (2014) (citing tax sources recognizing utilitarianism’s 
prevalence in tax scholarship or employing the frame). 
 18. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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non-legal literature, and suggest more careful consideration of 
other non-welfarist theories that have received relatively little 
attention in legal tax scholarship. I end with a brief conclusion. 
I. THE CODE’S SOLE-EARNER BIAS 
As the first Section of this Part recognizes, family models have 
evolved and diversified significantly over time, creating a panoply 
of arrangements. The Code, however, differentiates between only 
three types of parents—dual-earning married parents, sole-earning 
married parents, and unmarried parents. As the second Section of 
this Part shows, the Code has historically undertaxed sole earning 
couples compared with dual-earning couples and single parents, 
creating a sole-earner bias that the recently enacted Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (TCJA)19 not only reinforced but also sharpened. 
A. The Code’s Categorization of Parents 
There are various ways that parents support their children. 
Once children are older, parents may provide financial and 
emotional support.20 Younger children, however, require the 
consistent physical presence of a caregiver. To provide this support, 
parents must divvy the responsibilities of earning income and 
providing personal care—that is, they must choose a “parenting 
model.” Parenting models have both evolved and diversified a 
great deal over the past sixty years. 
 
 19. Act of December 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Many commentators refer to this legislation as the  
“Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” or “TCJA,” although it was not the official name of the Act passed 
and signed into law. 
 20. See, e.g., Kim Parker & Eileen Patten, The Sandwich Generation, PEW RSCH. CTR.  
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/01/30/the-sandwich-generation/ 
[https://perma.cc/8955-8HMK] (“According to a new nationwide Pew Research Center 
survey, roughly half (48%) of adults ages 40 to 59 have provided some financial support to 
at least one grown child in the past year, with 27% providing the primary support. These 
shares are up significantly from 2005.”); MARK LINO, KEVIN KUCZYNSKI, NESTOR RODRIGUEZ 
& TUSAREBECCA SCHAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2015, 
at 10 (2017) (providing recent estimates of annual child-rearing expenses among families). 
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1. Today’s diverse family models 
In the 1960s, American children were most often raised by two 
married,21 biological parents.22 In other words, in the aggregate, the 
“sole-earner model”—i.e., the model in which one parent earns all 
outside income while the other works only within the home—was 
normatively and statistically dominant. But there have always been 
significant and important demographic differences.23 To provide 
one of many possible examples, through the mid-1970s, black wives 
worked outside the home at a rate that was twelve to fourteen 
percent higher than white wives.24   
Today, far fewer families are “sole earners” regardless of race 
or ethnicity. Around 1980, “dual earners” became the norm among 
 
 21. In the 1960s, this would have only referred to opposite-sex couples, given the 
failure to recognize marriages among same-sex couples. 
 22. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO PRESENT, fig.CH-
1, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/time-
series/demo/families-and-households/ch-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58TR-EQ24] (showing 
percentage of children raised by married parents over time); see also PEW RSCH. CTR., 
PARENTING IN AMERICA: OUTLOOK, WORRIES, ASPIRATIONS ARE STRONGLY LINKED TO 
FINANCIAL SITUATION 15 (2015), https://perma.cc/3F6V-K227 [https://perma.cc/UR5D-
VS2S] [hereinafter PEW RSCH. CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA] (“[I]n 1960, the height of the 
post-World War II baby boom, there was one dominant family form. At that time 73% of all 
children were living in a family with two married parents in their first marriage.”). 
 23. See, e.g., ALLYSON SHERMAN GROSSMAN, WORKING MOTHERS AND THEIR 
CHILDREN, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE REPORTS—SUMMARIES 51–52, https://www.bls.gov/ 
opub/mlr/1981/05/rpt3full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9H2-AHKC] (explaining statistics 
about demographic differences). This Article does not summarize all relevant demographic 
statistics, an undertaking which would require discussion of issues including (but not 
limited to) the ways the methodologies used by government agencies to collect demographic 
data have changed over time and what problems persist with these methodologies and 
categorizations (which rely generally on self-identification). MGMT. & BUDGET OFF., 
STANDARDS FOR MAINTAINING, COLLECTING, AND PRESENTING FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND 
ETHNICITY (2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/09/30/2016-
23672/standards-for-maintaining-collecting-and-presenting-federal-data-on-race-and-
ethnicity [https://perma.cc/4XQB-853N and https://perma.cc/P426-MXCM] (describing 
review of 1997 questions used to “measure race and ethnicity”); see also Alex Wagner,  
The Americans Our Government Won’t Count, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/opinion/sunday/united-states-census.html 
(explaining history of Census’s collection of racial and ethnic data and identifying  
perceived problems). 
 24. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 23, at 51 (explaining statistics about 
demographic differences). 
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married-parent families in the aggregate25 and this has remained 
steadily true. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “among 
married-couple families with children [in 2019] . . . 64.2% had both 
parents employed” in some fashion.26 Furthermore, the number of 
American households in which both married parents work full-
time appears to be increasing. A Pew Research Center analysis of 
the 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS)27 found that 46% of 
married parents used a full-time-dual-earner model, “up from 31% 
in 1970.”28 Still, important demographic differences remain. For 
example, it remains more common for Black families to rely upon 
the dual-earner model than other demographic groups.29 
The increased prevalence of the dual-earner model is far from 
the only important trend. There has also been a marked increase in 
unmarried parents.30 Analyzing data from the 2015 CPS, the  
 
 25. See, e.g., id. at 49–51 (“[By] the . . . 1980s . . . children with working mothers 
[became] more the rule rather than the exception” among both black and white families, 
though families with a self-identified Hispanic parent were still less inclined to utilize a dual-
earner model, doing so in only about 44% of cases.); see also Scott A. Hodge & Andrew 
Lundeen, America Has Become a Nation of Dual-Income Working Couples, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 21, 
2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/america-has-become-nation-dual-income-working-
couples [https://perma.cc/RBE4-B2ZV] (providing graph showing over 50% of married 
couples were dual earners since 1980); PEW RSCH. CTR., THE RISE IN DUAL INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS (June 18, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/ft_dual-income-households-
1960-2012-2/ [https://perma.cc/R5K9-Y7S7 and https://perma.cc/96SX-BEZM]. 
 26. Economic News Release, Employment Characteristics of Families Summary ,  
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.nr0.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CFC4-HGRQ]. 
 27. The CPS is a monthly survey “sponsored jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) . . . [that] is the primary source of labor force 
statistics for the population of the United States.” See Current Population Survey (CPS), U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2FV-PEEM]. 
 28. See PEW RSCH. CTR., RAISING KIDS AND RUNNING A HOUSEHOLD: HOW WORKING 
PARENTS SHARE THE LOAD 2 (Nov. 4, 2015) [hereinafter PEW RSCH. CTR., RAISING KIDS AND 
RUNNING A HOUSEHOLD], http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/11/04/raising-kids-and-
running-a-household-how-working-parents-share-the-load/ [https://perma.cc/YQ6Q-
YYV9 and https://perma.cc/6TJU-VF38]. 
 29. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years and 
Marital Status of Parents, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin and Selected Characteristics of the 
Child for All Children: 2016, tbl.C3 (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/ATZ3-PSGA and https://perma.cc/77P4-6W6Z]. 
 30. Emily Badger, The Unbelievable Rise of Single Motherhood in America Over  
the Last 50 Years, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:03 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/18/the-unbelievable-rise-
of-single-motherhood-in-america-over-the-last-50-years/. 
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Pew Research Center reported that “[t]he share of children living 
in a two-parent household is at the lowest point in more than half 
a century: 69% are in this type of family arrangement today, 
compared with 73% in 2000 and 87% in 1960.”31 Reporting on CPS 
data that year, the Department of Labor reported, “the share of 
families that are one-parent . . . has nearly doubled since 1975.”32 
And the Center of Disease Control and Prevention found that 40% 
of 2014 births involved unmarried mothers,33 compared to 18% of 
births in 1980.34 Even more recent CPS data suggest that the trend 
away from the two-married-parent model is stable—in 2016  
and 2017 only about 65% of children were living with two  
married parents.35   
Once again, there are demographic differences. For instance, 
Black children are more likely to be raised by a “solo mother” than 
other demographic groups.  Summarizing the March 2017 Census 
Data, Pew Research reported that 47% of all Black children were 
being raised by a solo mother, compared to 23% of Hispanic 
children, 13% of white children, and 7% Asian children.36 
There are, of course, more than three family models. That is, not 
all families fit neatly within the “sole-earner,” “dual-earner,”  
or “single-parent” categories. Indeed, while there is a trend toward 
 
 31. PEW RSCH. CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 16. 
 32. WOMEN’S BUREAU U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKING MOTHERS ISSUE BRIEF 5 
(June 2016), https://ia801902.us.archive.org/1/items/WorkingMothersIssueBrief/ 
Working_Mothers_Issue_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG8K-N6U5]. 
 33. Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin, Michelle J. Osterman, Sally C. Curtin & T.J. 
Mathews, Births: Final Data for 2014, 64 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 7 (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3NV-
TU97]. Interestingly, this does represent a steady decline from 2007, when the single 
motherhood rate peaked at over 50%. Id. For purposes of this Article, however, the important 
observation is that single motherhood is becoming a common family composition. 
 34. Id. 
 35. For instance, in 2016, among demographic groups studied, the Census Bureau 
found that it was most common for Black children to be raised by unmarried parents and 
least common for Asian children. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 29. Falling in the 
statistical middle, about 30% of white children and about 40% of Hispanic children were 
raised by unmarried parents in 2016. See id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Living Arrangement 
of Children Under 18 Years and Marital Status of Parents by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic  
Origin and Selected Characteristics of the Child for All Children: 2017, tbl.C3, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/families/cps-2017.html. 
 36. Gretchen Livingston, About One-Third of U.S. Children Are Living with an Unmarried 
Parent, PEW RSCH. CTR. (April 27, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/04/27/about-one-third-of-u-s-children-are-living-with-an-unmarried-parent/ 
[https://perma.cc/8WGR-RPS3]. 
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the dual-earner and unmarried parent models, researchers have 
also found a trend away from models generally—that is, that there 
is no longer a “typical” U.S. family.37 Instead, the Pew Research 
Center elaborates, “there is no . . . dominant family form,” and 
instead, “[p]arents today are raising their children against a 
backdrop of increasingly diverse, and for many, constantly 
evolving family forms.”38 
Moreover, there is increased diversification within typologies. 
Unmarried parents increasingly cohabitate.39 Families with 
married parents are increasingly in blended families—that is, 
families in which “more than one family is mixed together, with at 
least one outside family member whose relationship is not shared 
with everyone.”40 Thus, while “the nuclear family . . . has declined 
to the point of no return[,]” it has been replaced by a “whole grab 
bag of family arrangements.”41 
But while American parenting models have evolved and 
diversified significantly over time,42 creating a great variety of 
arrangements, the Code differentiates between only three types of 
parents, adhering to the same typology it has used for decades. 
2. Acknowledged parenting models 
The Code, both before and after the TCJA took effect, divides 
parents into three rigid categories: 
 
 37. Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the 1950s, There Is No ‘Typical’ U.S. Family Today,  
WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the-1950s-there-is-no-typical-u-s-family/ 
?utm_term=.91b5f3f0ded4. 
 38. PEW RSCH. CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA, supra note 22. 
 39. Id. (citing statistics showing rise of unmarried cohabitant parents). 
 40. PHILIP COHEN, THE FAMILY: DIVERSITY, INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 370  
(2d ed. 2018). 
 41. Belinda Luscombe, There Is No Longer Any Such Thing as a Typical Family, TIME 
(Sept. 4, 2014, 1:01 AM), http://time.com/3265733/nuclear-family-typical-society-parents-
children-households-philip-cohen/ [https://perma.cc/Z85M-7S8Y]. 
 42. Schulte, supra note 37; PEW RSCH. CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA, supra note 22. 
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• sole-earning married couples; 
• dual-earning married couples; and 
• unmarried individuals.43 
Parents generally fall into the sole-earning married couple 
category (“sole earners”) if one parent earns every dollar of earned 
income.44 They fall into the dual-earning married couple bucket 
(“dual earners”) if both parents earn at least some income in the 
external workforce.45 
Unmarried parents are separated into two possible sub-
categories. As discussed more in Section I.B, unmarried parents 
who are primary caregivers for their minor children will often fall 
into the “head of household” bucket while unmarried parents that 
are non-primary caregivers will largely be treated like unmarried 
taxpayers without children (“single taxpayers”).46 
These lines are bright. For instance, if one married parent works 
full-time and earns 99% of all family income while the other works 
sporadically, earning 1% of overall earnings, that couple will be 
eligible for the same “dual-earner” benefits as a family in which 
both married parents work full-time and each earn half of all 
income. Further, the Code relies heavily on whether parents are 
married under federal law to make differentiations. To name two 
of many limitations, the Code does not ask whether a single parent 
shares a home with a cohabitant partner or whether parents  
are divorced.47 
 
 43. See infra Section I.B. The Code also distinguishes between unmarried parents that 
do and do not work in various ways, but these differences will often implicate anti-poverty 
measures, which are not the focus of this Article, as discussed infra Section II.A.3. 
 44. See infra Section I.B (discussing married-filing-jointly status and Code provisions 
allowing relief for working childcare expenses of dual earners). 
 45. See infra Section I.B. 
 46. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2018) (defining head of household). 
 47. Scholars have extensively and rightly criticized the Code’s overreliance on federal 
marriage to determine tax liabilities and eligibility for benefits (as described in Sections I.B 
and C). This Article does not disagree with this important literature. See Anne L. Alstott, 
Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social Security in the Age of 
Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 700 n.23 (2013) (“[A] number of scholars in taxation and 
family law have questioned the law’s reliance on outdated categories, including formal 
marriage and the nuclear family.”); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in 
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980) (advocating individual filing on 
equity and efficiency grounds); Infanti, supra note 7, at 605. 
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Among the three types of parents the Code acknowledges, it 
has historically favored sole earners, a preference that many legal 
tax scholars have criticized (discussed more in Section I.C). The 
TCJA did not eliminate this bias and, in fact, both entrenched and 
sharpened it. 
B. The TCJA and the Sole-Earner Bias 
This Section identifies two of the ways in which the TCJA 
reinforced and expanded the Code’s sole-earner bias. First, by 
failing to make long-overdue inflation adjustments to provisions of 
the Code that allow dual earners and single parents to receive relief 
for childcare costs incurred to work outside the home, the TCJA 
further embedded the Code’s preferences for sole earners.  Second, 
by curtailing benefits reserved for unmarried parents, it made the 
bias even worse than it was before.48 
1.  Working childcare benefits, ignored 
Before the TCJA, dual earners and single parents that incurred 
childcare costs to work (working childcare costs) had two choices. 
First, they could claim a “childcare tax credit” for childcare 
expenses “necessary for gainful employment,”49 which would 
reduce their tax liability dollar for dollar. But the credit was subject 
to very strict limits. Once a family earned more than $43,000 (far 
less than the median income for all families in 2017),50 dual earners 
could credit (and thus receive tax savings of) no more than $1,200 
if care of two or more children was involved and $600 for care of 
one child.51 
Alternatively, dual earners and single parents could claim a 
“dependent care exclusion” to reflect their working childcare costs, 
which would reduce their taxable income. Like the childcare tax 
credit, the dependent care exclusion was strictly limited—expenses 
were capped at $5,000.52 Unlike the credit, the actual tax savings of 
 
 48. For a more comprehensive analysis of the TCJA’s changes, see Shannon Weeks 
McCormack, Caregivers and Tax Reform: Before and After Snapshots, 39 VA. TAX REV. 
(forthcoming Summer 2020). 
 49. I.R.C. § 21 (2012). 
 50. See Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-263.html. 
 51. I.R.C. §§ 21, 129 (2012). 
 52. I.R.C. § 129 (2012). 
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the exclusion depended on the family’s marginal tax bracket. For 
instance, if a family’s marginal tax rate was 15%, the exclusion 
would provide a $750 benefit (15% x $5,000 reduction in taxable 
income) while those with a 39.6% marginal tax rate could receive a 
benefit of about $2,000 (39.6% x $5,000). 
Dual earners and single parents could claim the benefits that 
allowed the most savings (though could not double up). But 
regardless of whether the exclusion or credit was claimed, these 
parents often received relief for only a fraction of actual costs. I have 
written about this at great length elsewhere.53 In America, childcare 
costs can be very high. For instance, if children are not of school age 
and require full-time care, parents may spend as much (if not more) 
on childcare than they do on anything else in a given year.54 The 
annual expense of sending two preschool-aged children to a day 
care center can easily exceed $20,000.55 
Even for families with two school-aged children, the before- 
and after-school care needed to allow two parents to work full-time 
adds up quickly. According to Child Care Aware’s recent report, 
nine months of after-school care for two children can easily exceed 
$10,000 in some of the highest-cost states (which include Wyoming, 
Utah, Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, Alabama, Arizona, and 
Nevada, in addition to the more likely candidates of New York  
and Hawaii).56 
As a result of these stringent limitations, the Code has 
historically overtaxed dual earners and single parents, resulting in 
a sole-earner bias. Suppose, for instance, a single parent or dual-
earning couple spent $10,000 on childcare while working and 
claimed the maximum $1,200 credit. They would have been taxed 
only $1,200 less than a sole-earning couple with the same income, 
even though they had fully $10,000 less at their disposal. 
 
 53. See, e.g., Weeks McCormack, Over-Taxing the Working Family, supra note 1; Weeks 
McCormack, Postpartum Taxation, supra note 4; Shannon Weeks McCormack, America’s 
(D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws, 53 GA. L. REV. 1093 (2018–19) [hereinafter Weeks McCormack, 
America’s (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws]. 
 54. CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILDCARE 20 (2017), 
https://usa.childcareaware.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017_CCA_High_Cost_ 
Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG29-ZHHH]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 17. 
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As I have also explained elsewhere, this bias was created slowly 
over time.57 Since the enactment of the dependent care exclusion in 
1981, Congress has never once changed applicable caps ($5,000).58  
Furthermore, since that time, it has only changed the dollar caps 
and income phase-downs applicable to the “childcare tax credit” 
once “[i]n 2001—twenty years after the last change . . . . [And] [t]his 
adjustment did not even fully reflect inflation.” 59 
But even more can be said. The working childcare benefits 
discussed have always been available only to parents with enough 
taxable income to absorb them. As a result, the Code’s bias for sole 
earners extends to families with negative tax liabilities, too. Because 
working childcare benefits have never been refundable, dual 
earners and single parents at lower income ranges have never 
received any tax benefits to reflect the childcare costs they incur just 
to work (and that sole earners do not have to).60 
The TCJA changed the way parents were taxed in various ways, 
but it failed to make a single adjustment to the Code’s working 
childcare provisions. It did not adjust benefits to reflect decades of 
inflation or make benefits refundable for parents at lower income 
levels.61 Through this inaction, the TCJA did nothing to address the 
Code’s sole-earner bias. 
But there is still more. The Code has historically provided 
unmarried parents that qualify as “heads of households”62 with 
additional benefits to which married parents were not entitled. 
These benefits partially mitigated the Code’s bias between sole 
earners and single parents. But the TCJA curtailed these head of 
household benefits significantly, making the sole-earner bias even 
sharper than it was before. 
 
 57. Weeks McCormack, America’s (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws, supra note 53. 
 58. I.R.C. § 129. 
 59. Weeks McCormack, America’s (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws, supra note 53, at 1135; 
see also I.R.C. § 21. 
 60. See, e.g., Elaine Maag, How the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Reduced the Value of the Child Care 
Credit, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-tax-
cuts-and-jobs-act-reduced-value-child-care-credit [https://perma.cc/NU2C-RLAK]. 
 61. Furthermore, while the Code allows parents to claim a refundable Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), no differentiation is made 
between the dual- and sole-earner married parent models. 
 62. I.R.C. § 1(b) (2012). 
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2. Head of household benefits, curtailed 
Unmarried parents that qualify as “heads of households”63 
have traditionally been entitled to other benefits that married 
parents are not. Generally, “head of household” filing status can be 
claimed when an unmarried taxpayer has primary care of a 
qualifying individual. More specifically, a taxpayer can file as a 
head of household if (s)he is unmarried at the end of the taxable 
year and maintains (i.e., pays more than half the cost of)64 a 
household that is the principle place of abode of both the taxpayer 
and a qualifying individual (which generally includes dependent 
children) for more than half of the year.65 
For taxpayers with sufficient income to absorb them, the pre-
TCJA tax laws provided two head-of-household benefits. First, 
while all married taxpayers, regardless of number of children, were 
entitled to the same standard deduction (in 2017, $12,700), heads of 
households could claim a standard deduction that was greater than 
the deduction available to unmarried taxpayers without children.66 
In 2017, the standard deduction for heads of household was 
$9,350—approximately the average of $6,350 and $12,700, which 
are the standard deductions available to unmarried taxpayers that 
were not heads of household and to married taxpayers 
respectively.67 Second, the 2017 tax laws allowed heads of 
households to use a rate schedule that was more favorable than the 
rates that other unmarried taxpayers could use.   
These benefits at least softened the Code’s bias between sole-
earner married couples and single parents. But while the TCJA 
maintained the favorable, averaged standard deduction for heads 
of household, it drastically curtailed the favorable rate schedule for 
heads of household, watering down a benefit to which heads of 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (“A taxpayer shall be considered as maintaining a household 
only if he pays more than one-half the cost thereof for his taxable year.”). 
 65. I.R.C. § 2(a) (2012). 
 66. Rev. Proc. 2016-55 § 3.14(1). 
 67. Id. Like the childcare exclusion (discussed above), the benefits of this averaged 
standard deduction depended on the head of household’s marginal tax bracket and, as a 
result, those of higher incomes could receive more tax savings than those of lower income. 
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households had been entitled since 1951.68 And in doing so, the 
TCJA made its favoritism for sole earners even clearer. 
C. W(h)ither the Sole-Earner Bias? 
Influential lines of scholarship69 have now recognized that the 
Code taxes parents inequitably, undertaxing sole-earner couples 
compared to dual earners and single parents.70 And as I have 
explained, the TCJA served to entrench and further pronounce  
this bias. 
This scholarship has contributed to the legal tax literature in 
crucial ways. It has, for instance, revealed congressional favoritism 
and advanced conversations about gender, racial, and sexual 
inequities.71 Having revealed the disparate impacts of the sole-
earner bias, scholars have generally called for the elimination of the 
Code’s sole-earner bias.   
And for some (including myself) these arguments have been 
more than convincing. At the same time, these arguments remain 
susceptible to the criticism that they are theoretically incomplete. 
That critique may go roughly as follows. The tax laws are littered 
with tax preferences and incentives. Indeed, by statutory fiat, both 
the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury Department 
publish a capacious list of “tax expenditures” each year that 
chronicle the many tax provisions that deliberately result in 
preferentialism.72 It is, therefore, not enough to show that a bias 
exists, offensive as it might be to one’s sensibilities. 
To evaluate whether a particular tax preference is warranted, 
legal tax scholars have generally turned to distributive theories of 
justice, which offer competing frameworks to determine how 
 
 68. For discussion of history of head of household status, see, for example, Deborah 
H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 
139 (1989); Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349, 405 (1993) 
(discussing that income splitting is a weak rationale for head of household benefits). 
 69. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 1; 
Blumberg, supra note 1. 
 71. See sources cited supra notes 4–7. 
 72. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES  
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018–2022, JCX-81-18 (2018), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html? 
func=startdown&id=5148 [https://perma.cc/589G-UPPV]. 
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society’s resources should be allocated.73 Far from advocating 
blanket equality, these varied theories identify higher-order goals 
that justify tax preferences. For instance, adherents of welfarism 
advocate for a distribution of resources that maximizes overall 
social welfare, regardless of what inequities result.74 Optimal tax 
theorists prescribe unequal taxation to achieve the dual goals of 
maximizing social welfare and minimizing behavioral distortions.75 
And resource egalitarians tolerate inequality so long as it is not 
caused by bad luck entirely outside of one’s control (“brute luck”).76   
Legal tax scholars have invoked these and other theories to 
assess the wisdom of all sorts of tax preferences.77 However, critics 
might point out, scholars who have argued for the elimination of 
the Code’s sole-earner bias have often failed to fully link their 
arguments with this distributive tax literature. In this Article, which 
is the first part of a series of projects, I attempt to respond to these 
potential criticisms. In doing so, I hope to create a more complete 
argument about how parents should be taxed and draw more 
voices into the debate. In this first Article, I focus on welfarist 
theories78 because of the clear dominance they have exerted over 
distributive debates in legal scholarship.79 
II. WELFARISM AND SIMPLIFIED UTILITARIANISM 
Welfarism has exerted a remarkably strong influence in tax 
scholarship.80 As Professor Linda Sugin explains, welfarist theories 
“have had the upper hand in the tax policy literature for quite some 
time because their arguments sound in a combination of fairness 
and efficiency, and resonate as specific and determinative.”81  
And Professor Anne Alstott notes how welfarism has “dominated 
 
 73. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 14 (analyzing progressiveness of  
tax through welfarist lens); Alstott, supra note 15 (analyzing estate tax through lens  
of resource egalitarianism). 
 74. See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 11. 
 75. See, e.g., Mirrlees, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 13 and accompanying text; Fleischer, supra note 13 
and accompanying text. 
 77. See sources cited supra note 73. 
 78. Other distributive theories are addressed in companion work. See sources cited 
supra note 16. 
 79. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 81. Sugin, supra note 15, at 239–40. 
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normative legal analysis in the last generation” by offering 
“intellectual rigor” and rejecting the use of “ad hoc norms.”82  
To begin to link debates about the Code’s inequitable taxation of 
parents with the distributive tax literature, it makes sense to first 
focus on these welfarist theories. 
In the first Part of this Section, I provide a primer on welfarism, 
highlighting concepts often invoked in legal tax scholarship.  
To apply these frameworks to questions about the taxation of 
parents, I next start where legal tax scholars often do, applying 
utilitarianism with simplifying assumptions. I show that when 
assumptions are maintained, this “baseline utilitarian analysis” 
strengthens the case made by legal tax scholars for eliminating the 
Code’s sole-earner bias and may even prescribe special benefits for 
dual earners and single parents.   
A. A Primer on Welfarism 
Welfarism has been defined as “the principle that the goodness 
of a state of affairs depends ultimately on the set of individual 
utilities in that state, and—more demandingly—can be seen as an 
increasing function of that set.”83 Tracking this definition, I will 
refer to theories that view utility as the only object of interest as 
“welfarist theories” or “welfarism,” and will refer to theorists 
utilizing welfarism as “welfarists.”84 
A welfarist’s analysis will generally include the following two 
steps: first, individual utilities must be measured or otherwise 
estimated; second, a method of aggregating utilities must be 
selected by devising a “social welfare function.”85 There are 
different ways to view utility, and theoretically infinite social 
welfare functions could be devised to aggregate them. But the 
frameworks of all welfarists have two things in common:  
the welfarist’s only goal is to maximize the chosen function and the 
only variable of interest in that function is utility. 
 
 82. Alstott, supra note 15, at 474. 
 83. Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 464 (1979). 
 84. See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 263 (justifying limitation on individual  
well-being/utility). 
 85. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 15, at 911–13 (describing two-step analysis); see also 
KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 37 (describing two steps as well as others, such as determining 
whose utilities to aggregate in a particular case study). 
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1. What is utility anyway? 
To accomplish her analysis, the welfarist must generally decide 
what she means by utility. It will be no small task—a myriad of 
nuanced conceptions exists. This Part will sketch two prominent 
camps often occupied in the legal tax literature, starting with 
theorists who view utility in terms of mental states and turning to 
those who measure utility in terms of preference satisfaction.86 
The earliest accounts of utility focused on mental states. Indeed, 
one of the first versions construed utility solely in terms of 
“pleasure” and “pain.”87 Over time, “experience utilitarians” 
developed more nuanced views that added more depth to this 
pleasure/pain dichotomy. For instance, theorists seeking to  
move beyond the oversimplicity and “hedonism” of these 
interpretations,88 argued that utility should incorporate not only 
happiness but also more sophisticated mental states such as 
“knowledge, contemplation, or awareness.”89 
However, many welfarists (particularly economists) have now 
abandoned “subjective well-being” altogether and instead measure 
utility in terms of “preference satisfaction”—that is, they measure 
utility by asking how well an individual’s preferences are 
satisfied.90 Thus, while an experience utilitarian might ask how 
happy or fulfilled a given level of income makes a person, the 
preference utilitarian might ask to what extent that income allowed 
her to fulfill her preferences. 
The two may not always track one another. For instance, 
suppose that A uses her income to buy candy while B uses the same 
funds to buy nourishing food. B might be much happier than A 
once A realizes that she’s nauseous. But A and B may have fulfilled 
their ex ante preferences equally (that is, A really preferred the 
 
 86. Lawsky, supra note 15, at 912 n.32. 
 87. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM:  
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 100 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. 
Hart eds., 1970). 
 88. See, e.g., Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, Optimal Income Taxation Theory and 
Principles of Fairness, 56 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1029, 1036 (2018) (noting that some welfarists 
remain “convinced hedonists and believe that individuals who pursue other goals than 
happiness are mistaken”). 
 89. See, e.g., Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 259 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 257 (“Economists traditionally equate well-being with the satisfaction of 
actual preferences . . . .”). 
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Snickers bars and B really preferred the kale). In addition to 
showing problems of interpersonal comparisons—e.g., how do we 
know whose preference was stronger?—this simple hypothetical 
reveals two other issues along which preference utilitarians split. 
First, discerning actual preferences is hard to do. But “decision 
utilitarians” offer a way out—by looking at what individuals 
actually choose, they assert, individuals end up revealing their 
preferences through their own behavior.91 Tracking this “revealed 
preference view,” suppose A and B each could have made the 
other’s choices. The “revealed preference” view would suggest that 
the two individuals derived about the same utility from their 
income when they made their respective decisions to buy junk food 
and health food. After all, the theory goes, if A and B had the same 
range of choices, their actions probably satisfied their actual 
preferences to a roughly equal degree.92 But this ends up collapsing 
actual preferences into observations about behavior. 
This raises a second issue—even if both A and B’s ex ante 
preferences were equally fulfilled, we might not think the now-ill 
A and not sick B derived the same utility from these choices. People 
make bad, misinformed decisions. As a result, some utilitarians 
adhere to the preference satisfaction frame but limit the inquiry to 
“informed” preferences. Put another way, these theorists would 
“launder” preferences to be both idealized and self-interested, 
including only “those items that well-informed, rational, self-
interested individuals would generally prefer.”93 Under this frame, 
perhaps, A’s candy preference might be filtered out of the calculus 
since, had she known how much her stomach would ache, she 
would not have chosen to buy all that candy. 
As one should have no difficulty believing, there are many 
other sub-camps that have emerged in the legal and non-legal 
welfarist literature that offer further refinements to the definition 
of utility. But this Article will focus on two conceptions upon which 
legal tax theorists have often concentrated: (1) the mental state view 
(e.g., happiness or fulfillment) and (2) the actual preference 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 
123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002) (when individuals have the same 
choices one can assume they have the same utility). 
 93. Adler & Posner, supra note 89, at 254. 
2.MCCORMACK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:04 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
106 
 
satisfaction view.94 The filtered preference view raises extremely 
interesting questions when applied to caregiving including, but not 
limited to, the question of how to deal with “other regarding 
preferences” that may not actually improve—or may even 
reduce—the well-being of parents. Full exploration of this set of 
questions is reserved for companion work. 
Once a welfarist has decided how to define utility, she must 
then choose her social welfare function. 
2. Social welfare functions 
Once utility has been defined and somehow measured or 
estimated, the welfarist must decide how she wishes to aggregate 
those utilities. She must, in welfarist parlance, devise a social 
welfare function. In theory, one could create infinite functions all of 
which can qualify as welfarist so long as utility is the sole variable.95 
Adherents of utilitarianism—one type of welfarism that has 
exerted a particularly strong influence on tax scholarship—adopt a 
linear function equal to the simple sum of individual utilities.96  
As a result, if an heiress derives more utility from purchasing caviar 
than a pauper derives from purchasing bread, the utilitarian will 
deem the former action preferable. The fact that this may be 
deemed unfair will not, in itself, change the utilitarian’s analysis 
unless that unfairness affects utility itself. For instance, if 
individuals have a disdain for or preference against unfairness that 
reduces utility, then that will get factored into the analysis.97 
Otherwise, it will not. Perhaps for these reasons, utilitarianism has 
been called the “least egalitarian” form of welfarism,98 though its 
proponents argue that its equal regard for each individual’s utility 
provides ample recognition of equity concerns.99 
 
 94. The revealed preference view will be addressed in footnotes and its significant 
limitations in this context explained. 
 95. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 14. 
 96. Id. at 1915 (discussing how utilitarianism looks at unweighted sum of utilities). 
 97. KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 42 n.5 (explaining that individual utility includes 
pleasure one derives from fairness but not fairness for its own sake). An implication is that 
notions of fairness or equity have no role unless they are concerned with the distribution of 
utility or they are in some respect a proxy for effects on utility. Id. at 42. 
 98. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 14, at 1916 n.51. 
 99. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 
197, 199 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980) (“According to one interpretation, this equality of 
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But utilitarianism is only one type of welfarism. And other 
egalitarian principles can be introduced into the welfarists’ analysis 
if she adopts a nonlinear “social welfare function” that weighs 
utilities differently.100 For instance, a welfarist might assign 
“greater weight to the well-being of the least well-off . . . .”101 
Unlike the utilitarian, this welfarist might grant the pauper the loaf 
of bread after all, even though the heiress would enjoy more utility 
from her caviar. 
As discussed, welfarist theories have dominated tax discourse. 
And while more controversial in other areas, utilitarianism has 
exerted a particularly strong influence on distributive justice 
conversations in the legal tax scholarship.102 This next Section, 
therefore, asks how utilitarian theory might inform an analysis of 
how parenting models should be taxed relative to one another.  
It begins where legal tax scholarship often does—employing 
utilitarianism with specific baseline assumptions. 
B. Utilitarianism in the Tax Law, with Baseline Assumptions 
To determine how close the tax rules come to the utilitarian 
ideal, one must somehow ascertain how much utility individuals 
derive from the income that is being taxed—or, conversely, how 
much utility is lost from taxing it. Alternatively, one can recognize 
that this is implausible and make assumptions. Choosing the latter 
route, legal tax scholars often employ three baseline assumptions. 
1. Common baseline assumptions 
Legal theorists have often made three assumptions to begin a 
utilitarian analysis of the tax laws:103 
 
marginal utility embodies equal treatment of everyone’s interests.”); KAPLOW, supra note 11, 
at 282 (discussing how many criticisms of welfarism’s failure to account for equity 
mistakenly and/or misleadingly focus on utilitarianism). 
 100. See KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 282 (discussing different social welfare functions); 
Bankman & Griffith, supra note 14, at 1915–16 (same). 
 101. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 14, at 1916. 
 102. Fleischer, supra note 17 (citing various tax sources that recognize utilitarianism’s 
prevalence in tax scholarship or employ the frame). 
 103. Id. at 1506 (discussing three assumptions). 
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• First, the marginal utility of income is declining for all 
individuals;  
• Second, all individuals enjoy the same utility from the same 
income (and thus have identical utility of income curves); and 
• Third, “measuring income or wealth is the best proxy for 
measuring utility.” 
The first assumption may warrant some attention for the 
novice. It is easy to tell an intuitive story about why the marginal 
utility of income—that is, the additional utility derived from each 
additional dollar of income—might decline. One might expect an 
additional dollar of income to create more utility for the pauper 
than the heiress. To be clear, this is different than claiming that the 
pauper should value the dollar more. This claim is normative and 
irrelevant in traditional utilitarian analysis. 
More technically, if one has a “strictly declining marginal utility 
of income . . . [their] utility curve [will be] strictly concave, . . . the 
slope of the utility curve [will be] strictly decreasing, and . . . the 
second derivative of the utility curve [will be] negative.” 104  
A depiction follows: 
 
 
 104. Lawsky, supra note 15, at 915. 
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Because the curve flattens as income rises, the marginal utility 
of income is strictly declining. Put another way, when one’s income 
is on the left-most portion of the curve, each additional dollar of 
income leads to a steeper jump in utility than it will when one’s 
income falls farther to the right where the curve flattens. 
Using these baseline assumptions, transfers to the pauper will 
create more utility than transfers to the heiress and, thus, will be 
deemed desirable. Indeed, if (but only if) these assumptions hold, a 
transfer from higher to lower income individuals will always 
maximize overall utility (the utilitarian’s goal) until marginal 
utilities have been completely equalized (i.e., everyone is on the 
same point of the utility curve). But even more can be said. Under 
these assumptions, marginal utility and total utility will be both 
equalized and maximized at the same points. But this happy result 
is “equality by serendipity”105 and does not hold if assumptions  
are relaxed. 
With this in mind, I now ask how “baseline utilitarianism” can 
inform an analysis about the Code’s current taxation of parents?106 
To consider this question, it is important to be explicit about several 
preliminary assumptions that meet the U.S. tax laws “where  
they are.” 
First, it is assumed that children will not be treated like purely 
consumptive goods, such as pets, as some have argued.107 This is 
important because the Code does not usually allow taxpayers to 
recover costs associated with purely consumptive items.108 The 
below discussion, however, assumes that the Code will continue to 
provide some benefits to parents of dependent children (as it has 
historically done)109 and focuses on the question of how these 
 
 105. Sen, supra note 99, at 202 (“This is, however, egalitarianism by serendipity: just the 
accidental result of the marginal tail wagging the total dog.”). 
 106. KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 315 (“[A]nalysis of the purely distributive dimension of 
the taxation of families requires a careful microeconomic examination inside the black box 
of family units.”). 
 107. Martha Fineman, Having a Child Is Nothing Like Deciding to Buy a Porsche, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2013, 7:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/dec/01/harvard-professor-maternity-coverage-children-porsche (discussing a Harvard 
professor’s statement that the choice to have a child is analogous to the choice of what car  
to drive). 
 108. I.R.C. § 262. 
 109. Weeks McCormack, America’s (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws, supra note 53. 
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benefits should be distributed among families who earn the same 
income but use different family models.   
Second, but relatedly, the discussion assumes that childcare 
expenses incurred while working will not be treated as pure costs 
of earning income, for which full recovery might be justified under 
fundamental tax principles.110  Instead, this Article assumes that the 
Code will continue its failure to categorize working childcare 
expenses in this manner. 
Third, this Section assumes that the Code will continue  
to differentiate only between three family models discussed in 
Section I.A.2.   
It is worth being explicit about these points because I do not 
endorse them. To the contrary, scholars (including myself) have 
roundly criticized these stances as being, for instance, peculiarly 
American,111 theoretically immature,112 gendered,113 raced,114 and 
heteronormative.115 But I use these starting points provided by 
current laws to begin the inquiry of what utilitarianism suggests 
about the Code’s current taxation of parents.   
To begin this analysis, it will be useful to imagine three families. 
Each family has two small children and earns the same income, I. 
But each family uses a different parenting model. In the Single 
Family, solo mother (Single Parent) earns all of the family income I 
by working full-time and does not have a cohabitant or other 
involved partner. In Family Sole, there are two married parents (the 
Sole Earners) but one parent earns all income I while the other 
works inside the home. And in Family Dual, there are two married 
parents (the Dual Earners) but both parents work full-time in the 
external workforce, and together earn income I. An analysis of 
these three families allows for the starkest comparisons between 
 
 110. Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 1, at 593 (“The 
preceding analysis strongly suggests that working childcare costs are, at least in significant 
part,  nonconsumptive expenditures for which substantial tax  relief is warranted.”); see also 
I.R.C. § 162 (allowing recovery of costs associated with a trade or business); I.R.C. § 212 
(allowing recovery of costs associated with for-profit activities, though not applicable  
until 2026). 
 111. Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 1, at 564 n.20;  
see ROBERT W. DRAGO, STRIKING A BALANCE: WORK, FAMILY, LIFE (2007). 
 112. Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 1, at 584. 
 113. McCaffery, supra note 4; Staudt, supra note 1; Alstott, supra note 47. 
 114. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 115. Infanti, supra note 7. 
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the models the Code recognizes, hopefully generating insights that 
can be extended to a more heterogeneous reality.   
2. Application of baseline utilitarianism 
When the baseline assumptions (discussed in Section II.B.1) are 
maintained, the only way utility of income can differ among 
parents (or individuals more generally) is if income differs. By 
assumption, each of our hypothetical families earns income I from 
paid labor. But single parents and dual earners will often incur 
more work-related costs (including, but not only, childcare costs) 
than sole earners. Relatedly, single parents and dual earners may 
produce less so-called “imputed income” from household labor 
than sole earners. For instance, sole earners may be able to provide 
childcare and other household services that dual earners and single 
parents cannot perform while working (and which they may 
purchase on the external market). 
As a result, Single Parent and the Dual Earners may have less 
actual income than the Sole Earners even though they initially earn 
the same amount I from paid labor. And when baseline 
assumptions are maintained, this might suggest a utilitarian case 
for eliminating the sole-earner bias and providing special benefits 
to dual earners and single parents.   
To illustrate this, I begin with childcare costs that must be 
incurred to work (as opposed to those that are not associated with 
earning income, such as babysitting for date nights). These working 
childcare expenses are often one of the most significant costs 
working parents like Single Parent and the Dual Earners incur. 
Assume that both Single Parent and the Dual Earners incur 
childcare costs C to work.116 By contrast, because the Sole Earners 
do not have to incur these expenses to work, C = 0. Put together, 
Single Parent and the Dual Earners have disposable income I – C 
while the Sole Earners have disposable income I. 
Because of the assumption that all families have identical and 
strictly declining utility curves, Single Parent and the Dual Earners 
will shift left of I, to a lower and steeper part of the presumed curve. 
As a result, Single Parent and the Dual Earners will have higher 
 
 116. Note that this assumes for simplicity that these expenses are the same though they 
certainly could differ at which point different variables could be created, for example, CS 
and CD. 
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marginal utilities of income than the Sole Earners. This, in turn, 
suggests that a transfer of C to Single Parent and the Dual Earners 
and away from the Sole Earners would enhance overall utility (the 
utilitarian’s goal).117  
This idea could be represented graphically as follows:  
 
 
 There are numerous other differences that could be explored. 
For instance, one might turn to differences in imputed income 
production.  Suppose, for instance, that the non–wage earner of the 
Sole Earners devotes a great deal of time providing a clean home, 
healthy meals, and help on her children’s homework. Allow the 
value of this imputed income to be i, so that the Sole Earners’ total 
income can now be denoted I + i.   
Now assume that Single Parent is unable to devote as much 
time to the above activities.118 But she does not make external 
purchases to compensate—her house is just not as neat, her meals 
 
 117. This is very similar to the Goldin/Liscow model discussed below, infra Section 
III.B.1. However, it is not clear whether utility curves are presumed to be identical or not, 
and I do not want to mischaracterize their work. 
 118. The activities exclude childcare for which she pays, as that will result in  
double counting. 
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not as healthy, and her children less able to benefit from her 
assistance. To quantify, she only produces imputed income i – x, so 
that her total income is (I – C) + (i – x). Because the Sole Earners 
produce additional imputed income (x), they will be pushed farther 
to the right on the assumed curve (where marginal utility is 
presumed to flatten) than Single Parent will. The distance between 
the family models will widen, suggesting that an even larger 
transfer of C + x from Sole Earners to Single Parent would enhance 
utility. A similar case for differentiating the Dual Earners from the 
Sole Earners could be made, assuming the former produces less 
imputed income than the latter (though, of course, this gap may be 
narrower than the gap between Single Parent and the Sole Earners). 
So, for instance, the graphs might look something like the one 
below, with the actual distance C + x between the curves expanding 
or contracting depending on the value of those variables.  
 
One could continue on this path for some time to create further 
nuance. For instance, one might add a variable that recognizes 
differences in work-related costs (dual earners will incur two sets 
of costs while single parents and sole earners will only incur one). 
Another variable could capture differences in expenses incurred to 
“outsource” home maintenance. To provide one example, single 
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parents and dual earners may sometimes hire housekeepers and 
other service providers to achieve the standard of living that sole 
earners can hypothetically achieve without monetary cost and 
which they may often actually achieve at less expense.   
But the above discussion is already sufficient to show the 
following: when one applies utilitarianism under the baseline 
assumptions often used in legal tax literature, a case for eliminating 
the sole-earner bias emerges. Put another way, baseline 
utilitarianism seems to reinforce the arguments made by legal tax 
scholars who have urged Congress to end the Code’s favoritism 
towards sole earners. Indeed, baseline utilitarianism might even 
prescribe special benefits for dual earners and single parents.   
The strength of these prescriptions, however, is dependent on 
the strength of the assumptions made. In the next Part, I reexamine 
these assumptions and show that however useful they may be 
generally, they are particularly implausible in the present context. 
I identify numerous reasons why this is true and then explore what 
utilitarianism might prescribe once assumptions are relaxed.   
III. UTILITARIANISM, BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS RELAXED 
A. The General Case for Baseline Utilitarianism’s Assumptions 
As discussed, when utilitarianism is applied to the tax laws, 
theorists often begin by assuming that individuals enjoy the same 
strictly declining utility over all income ranges. This is not because 
welfarists think that this is true. Rather, the assumptions are 
employed because they are believed to be correct enough to 
provide a useful baseline case.119 However, their ability to provide 
valuable information seems to rest on how true the following two 
statements are: 
• Statement 1: Individuals who have the same income have a 
similar range of choices; and 
• Statement 2: Individuals with a similar range of choices 
experience similar utility.120 
 
 119. Lawsky, supra note 15, at 904. 
 120. See Shaviro, supra note 92, at 127 (discussing how when individuals have the same 
choices one can assume they have the same utility). 
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It is certainly not the case that these statements are universally 
accepted to be true. For instance, the idea that individuals with the 
same income have roughly the same choices has been criticized 
roundly as “fetishizing” resources.121 Indeed, theorists such as 
Amartya Sen have developed approaches that explicitly repudiate 
the idea that equal possession of resources can proxy equal choices 
given the panoply of social factors—for example, physical and 
mental disability, mental illness, discrimination—that curtail 
individual opportunities.122 
But I do not seek to assess the wisdom of these assumptions as 
a global matter. Instead, I argue that even if these baseline 
assumptions are generally helpful, they are not realistic in the 
present context. While the discussion that follows is (naturally) not 
exhaustive, it identifies numerous reasons why utility of income 
curves can be expected to differ across parenting models. The 
discussion also reveals two related reasons why this is true: First, 
individuals using different parenting models will not have the 
same choices (i.e., opportunity sets) just because they have the same 
income. In other words, Statement 1 is untenable. And relatedly, 
the extent to which income can be expected to serve as a sound 
proxy for utility will differ depending on the parenting model used.   
B. The Particular Case of Parents 
As discussed above in Section II.B.2, single parents and dual 
earners will often incur significant childcare costs to earn income 
that sole earners do not have to, resulting in differences in 
disposable income. As also discussed, when one maintains baseline 
assumptions of identical, strictly declining utility curves, the effect 
of these expenditures is straightforward—the costs shift single 
parents and dual earners towards the left, steeper portion of the 
curve, suggesting that at a given earned income level, (I) transfers 
towards these families (and away from sole earners) will enhance 
utility. As a result, the baseline utilitarianism often invoked by legal 
 
 121. Amartya Sen, The Standard of Living (March 11–12, 1985), in THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, at 3, 16–17 [https://perma.cc/N8G2-MXC8] (discussing 
relevance of Karl Marx’s and Adam Smith’s previous criticisms of commodities fetishism in 
other contexts to the standard of living). 
 122. Amartya Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995). 
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tax scholars seems to create a case for eliminating the Code’s  
sole-earner bias. 
But in reality, because dual earners and single parents need to 
pay for childcare to work while sole earners can typically avoid 
these expenses, they do not have the same opportunity sets. As a 
result, utility of income curves can also be expected to vary. In other 
words, the need to pay for childcare will change the shape of the 
curves, not just shift dual earners and single parents to a different 
space on the same curve.   
I now look at how differences in working childcare expenses 
might change the utility of income for our hypothetical families. 
1.  Childcare costs 
How might differences in necessary childcare costs change 
utility of income curves? There are numerous possibilities, a few of 
which will be sketched here to illustrate a key point—because  
of differences in working childcare expenditures, it becomes 
implausible to assume that utility of income curves are identical  
(or even substantially similar) across parenting models.   
a. Possibility 1: Higher and steeper.  One possibility is that the need 
to—as contrasted with the discretionary choice to—incur childcare 
costs increases the actual and marginal utility of income for single 
parents and dual earners relative to sole earners, over some income 
range that reflects these expenses. To the extent this story is true, 
the former two models would have utility of income curves that are 
higher and steeper than the latter model’s curves (again, over the 
portion of the curve that reflects the childcare expenses). 
Recently, Professors Goldin and Liscow123 developed what I 
believe to be a case for this interpretation. In making “a welfarist 
case for maintaining an extra subsidy for single parents,”124 their 
work represents one of few attempts in the legal tax literature to 
connect observations about parenting models to welfarist 
principles. Also to their credit, I read Goldin and Liscow to go 
somewhat beyond baseline utilitarian assumptions to recognize 
that utility curves may differ among parenting models. 
 
 123. See generally Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking 
the Taxation of Single Parents, 71 TAX L. REV. 367, 367–68 n.2 (2018). I am not claiming to 
address the nuances of the Goldin/Liscow model in their totality. Their argument rests on 
similar analysis regarding the marginal utility of consumption. 
 124. Id. at 393. 
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Goldin and Liscow primarily compare single parents and sole-
earner models but acknowledge that their analysis can be extended 
to dual and sole-earner models as well. They write: 
The extra tax benefit for single parents with children compensates 
for the extra cost of raising a child as a result of not benefitting 
from the additional home child care a partner can 
provide. . . . [B]ecause singles need to pay for child care outside of 
the home, . . . [it may be more] valuable for the government to 
increase transfers for singles than for married couples when they 
have a child. 125 
In other words, working parents require childcare, and without 
it they cannot work. It is an essential necessity in their lives. Indeed, 
we might expect many dual earners and single parents to 
experience feelings such as relief and gratitude if they successfully 
secure needed childcare, a task which can be difficult in America 
(discussed more below).   
Tracking this, one might argue, some single parents and dual 
earners may experience higher actual utility over some income 
range that reflects these needs, resulting in a portion of their utility 
of income curves being higher than sole earners.126 Along similar 
lines, just as we might expect individuals to experience higher 
marginal utility of income when income is needed to pay for food 
and other basic needs than when it is used to purchase luxuries, we 
might believe that the need to pay for childcare results in dual 
earners and single parents having higher marginal utility of income 
than sole earners over some range. This would suggest that the 
relevant portion of the former curves are steeper for the former two 
families compared to the latter.   
The scenario may be plausible for some families, particularly 
those who are able to afford and attain high quality external care.127 
But if one more closely considers the lived experiences of most dual 
earners and single parents, one finds an equally plausible case that 
the reverse might be true—that is, that the need to spend earned 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. This is so prescriptions will largely track the baseline utilitarianism’s prescriptions 
outlined above—that is, utilitarianism may still prescribe elimination of the Code’s sole-
earner bias and suggest special benefits for dual earners and single parents. 
 127. Even if true, this implicates problematic issues of adaptive preferences.  
Miriam Teschl & Flavio Comim, Adaptive Preferences and Capabilities: Some Preliminary 
Conceptual Explorations, 63 REV. SOC. ECON. 229, 229–47 (2005). 
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income on childcare results in the lowering and flattening of utility 
curves over many income ranges.   
b. Possibility 2: Lower and flatter. I now explore the possibility that 
the need to incur childcare costs decreases the actual and marginal 
utility of income for single parents and dual earners relative to sole 
earners, over some income range. To the extent this story is true, the 
former two models might have utility of income curves that are 
lower and flatter than the latter model’s curves (again, over the 
portion of the curve that reflects childcare expenses). 
I start with the idea that the curves might be lower over some 
range (i.e., because the need to pay for childcare results in lower 
actual utility of income). To illustrate an especially strong case, 
return to the view of utility as “actual preference satisfaction,” 
discussed in Section II.A.1. Because of the need to pay for childcare 
while working full-time, one might observe, single parents and 
dual earners will not have the same array of spending choices sole 
earners will have, even when each family earns the same income. 
Returning to our variables, for Single Parent and the  
Dual Earners, income I is encumbered by the obligation to pay C to 
earn income, so they have only I – C at their disposal.128 By contrast, 
one could argue the Sole Earners have their entire income I to spend 
unencumbered.129 As a result, one might expect sole earners to be 
able to fulfill more of their actual preferences with income I than 
single parents and dual earners can with income I – C, creating an 
argument that single-earning two-parent families may derive  
more utility from their income than dual earners and single  
parent families. 
This idea (i.e., that the need to pay childcare lowers the utility 
of income curves of single parents and dual earners relative to sole 
earners over some range) can be developed further by looking at 
the importance of the preferences at stake. Suppose the main concern 
was that sole earners were able to dine at restaurants that are 
slightly more pleasing than the restaurants at which single parents 
and dual earners can dine. One might not think that the utility each 
 
 128. And in America, where childcare costs are high, this may be a sizeable percentage 
of a family’s income. CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., supra note 54 (“Across all states, the 
average cost of center-based infant care exceeds 27 percent of the median [household] income 
for single [working] parents.”). 
 129. But see infra Section III.B.3 regarding differences in autonomy and discretion over 
use of income. 
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derives from their income (which they use to purchase their  
dining experiences) diverges significantly (though, in truth, they 
still might).   
However, the discussion at hand does not involve preferences 
that are likely to be “mild” or “marginal.” Instead, it implicates 
preferences most parents will rank (very) highly—preferences 
about how often children are cared for by a parent.130 With this in 
mind, one might observe that sole earners (who retain an available 
parent in the home) have more ability to fulfill this preference for 
parental care than single parents and dual earners enjoy. Sole 
earners might choose to pay for childcare for any myriad of reasons 
but could also choose not to. 
By contrast, one might continue, single parents and dual 
earners with full-time work obligations do not have such expansive 
choice sets—they must secure non-parental care in order to earn 
income I. In other words, a case may be made that sole earners not 
only have greater ability to fulfill more preferences (because they 
have disposable income I as opposed to I – C), but that they also 
have greater ability to fulfill an important, highly ranked preference for 
parental care. 
Indeed, with this in mind, one might even argue that the 
payment of C for childcare costs could create disutility for some 
dual earners and single parents (who have no choice but to incur 
these expenses if they are to earn income I). To more fully 
understand how this can be so, consider two particularly relevant 
contextual factors—current norms of parenting and America’s lack 
of affordable external childcare options.131   
 
 130. I set aside for another article the issue of other-regarding preferences, which could 
muddy even these waters. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: 
Fairness, Utility and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 190 (2000) (discussing other-
regarding preferences). 
 131. SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, JOHN P. ROBINSON & MELISSA MILKIE, CHANGING RHYTHMS 
OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 60–61, 92 (2006) (“[P]arenting practices are affected by cultural 
norms and values that convey notions of appropriate parental behavior. . . . Ethnographic 
studies of parenting practices suggest that parental behavior has changed with the 
emergence of ‘intensive mothering’ and ‘involved fathering’ in recent decades.”). As one 
Pew Research study found, “[p]arents care a lot about what their spouse or partner thinks of 
how they are doing as a parent, and they care what their own parents think as well.  
The opinions of friends and neighbors are important, too, [though] less so.” PEW RSCH. CTR., 
PARENTING IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 30. 
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Begin with parenting norms. Few would argue with the idea 
“that children need and deserve time with their parents”132 and 
“should be raised by parents, not by strangers.”133 But what 
constitutes adherence to these basic ideas has changed dramatically 
over time.134 During some periods of history, American parents 
could outsource large portions of childcare without feeling that 
they had violated societal expectations—during World War II, for 
instance, few questioned Rosie the Riveter’s choice to find external 
childcare so she could work.135 And in the late 1800s, to provide 
another example, “domesticating children was a job [middle-  
and upper-class mothers] would just as soon hand over to  
someone else.”136 
Today, however, parental norms “valorize[] a time-intensive, 
parent-centric . . . model of childrearing that demands more 
resources than ever before.”137 These norms of “intensive care” 
have “been common in upper-middle-class households for at least 
a generation.”138 Recent survey data, however, suggests that “this 
child-rearing philosophy now has a much broader appeal, one that 
holds across race and class.”139 The authors of that study concluded 
as follows: 
Results indicate that parents of different social classes express 
remarkably similar support for intensive mothering and fathering 
across a range of situations, whether sons or daughters are 
involved. These findings suggest that cultural norms of child-
 
 132. Joan C. Williams, Sandberg vs. Slaughter: Both Right, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joan-williams/ann-marie-slaughter_b_1619324.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FUC-VUCF]. 
 133. Joan C. Williams, Restructuring Work and Family Entitlements Around Family Values, 
19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 753 (1996). 
 134. See, e.g., Mary Blair-Loy, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG 
WOMEN (2003) (outlining the various approaches of female executives for balancing career 
and family). 
 135. Jennifer H. Sperling, Reframing the Work-Family Conflict Debate by Rejecting the Ideal 
Parent Norm, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 47, 63 (“During the war, many  
mothers were, by necessity encouraged to work, taking the places of men who were now 
fighting overseas.”). 
 136. Id. at 57. 
 137. Id. at 48. 
 138. Joe Pinsker, ‘Intensive’ Parenting Is Now the Norm in America, ATLANTIC  
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/01/intensive-
helicopter-parenting-inequality/580528/. 
 139. Id. 
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centered, time-intensive mothering and fathering are now 
pervasive, pointing to high contemporary standards for parental 
investments in children.140 
Given these increasingly pervasive “norm[s] of exhaustive 
care,”141 one can more easily see how some dual earners and single 
parents might experience disutility when using their earned 
income to outsource childcare. As one commentator put it, “[t]he 
style of child-rearing that most aspire to takes a lot of time and 
money, and many families can’t pull it off.”142 This also suggests 
that disutility may be disproportionately felt by those of lower 
socioeconomic status and that racial and demographic differences 
are likely to exist.   
The idea that childcare purchases may cause disutility for some 
single parents and dual earners becomes even more concretized 
when one considers the lack of affordable childcare options 
available to American working parents. If these parents had an 
array of quality childcare providers to choose from, one might 
expect the disutility experienced from outsourcing childcare to be 
(at least somewhat) tempered. But American working parents do 
not enjoy plentiful choices to fulfill their childcare preferences.   
The American government does not subsidize childcare 
facilities like other nations, making them expensive, not readily 
available and of spotty quality. When compared to the United 
States, “other liberal welfare states display less resistance than the 
United States to the idea that motherhood should trigger benefits 
entitlements.”143 Thus, rather than offering parents affordable and 
accessible childcare and preschool like its peers, the United States 
forces parents to compete for limited spots at expensive, privately 
run facilities that often provide rather mediocre care.144 
In sum, given demanding parental norms and lack of desirable 
childcare options, some dual earners and single parents may pay a 
significant percentage of their income (C/I%) for childcare they 
 
 140. Patrick Ishizuka, Social Class, Gender, and Contemporary Parenting Standards in the 
United States: Evidence from a National Survey Experiment, 98 SOC. FORCES 31, 31 (2018). 
 141. Sperling, supra note 135, at 77. 
 142. Pinsker, supra note 138. 
 143. Linda A. White, The United States in Comparative Perspective: Maternity and Parental 
Leave and Child Care Benefits Trends in Liberal Welfare States, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 185, 185 
(2009); see DRAGO, supra note 111. 
 144. See generally CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., supra note 54. 
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would actually prefer not to use and/or feel unhappy using. Of 
course, not all single and dual earning parents will feel so 
negatively about using non-parental care, and some will find 
external providers with whom they feel very comfortable. Even in 
these cases, however, it does not follow that single parents and dual 
earners will enjoy as much utility when they use their income to 
pay for childcare to earn income as the sole earners experience 
when they spend C as they choose.145 
This discussion has so far suggested that the need to pay for 
childcare might lower a portion of the utility of income curves for 
many single parents and dual earners relative to sole earners. There 
is also an argument that the curves of single parents and dual 
earners might be flatter—i.e., less steep—than sole earners because 
of these costs. Recall that the steepness of a utility of income curve 
depends on the marginal utility of income—that is, how much 
additional utility is created when an additional dollar of income  
is earned.   
Also recall the argument that the need to pay for childcare 
might increase the marginal utility of income for dual earners and 
single parents. Just as we might expect families to have higher 
marginal utility of income when used to purchase food and other 
basic necessities than when they are purchasing luxuries, one might 
think that the need to pay for childcare has a similar effect.  
But while of some initial appeal, this argument has strong counters.   
Is it really likely that income earned to pay for any particular 
day (hour?) of childcare that enables a person to work will enhance her 
utility more than any other day? Does it not seem just as plausible 
that she derives very little additional utility for each increment of 
care, suggesting a very flat curve along whatever income range 
reflects the needed childcare purchase? Digging deeper, it may be 
that childcare is a “lumpy” good—that is, a good that “cannot be 
usefully provided in any amount[] but only in more or less massive 
‘lumps.’”146 While an individual can enjoy cookies or tennis lessons 
in increments, one generally only enjoys an automobile once 
purchased in its entirety. Similarly, because one may need to work 
 
 145. It is possible, however, that adaptive preferences could lead to this conclusion. 
These more nuanced conceptions of utility are discussed in companion work. 
 146. Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1958 (2012) (citing 
Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-
Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982)). 
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a set number of hours to retain a job and/or earn sufficient income, 
childcare may only be useful when received in chunks.147 If 
childcare is a lumpy good, single parents and dual earners may 
have flat (and perhaps very low) utility curves until they are able 
to earn enough to purchase worthwhile amounts of childcare. And 
they may only then experience a surge equal to whatever (perhaps 
minimal) utility is ultimately derived from the payment of C in 
exchange for the childcare they need to earn income and/or keep 
their job. 148 
There are countless nuances that could be explored. For 
instance, the way in which power and autonomy are shared among 
two parent families might differ depending on the number of 
earners.  Perhaps, for example, the non–wage earner of a sole earner 
couple may wish (s)he could outsource more childcare but not feel 
that (s)he has the autonomy to do so.149  But I do not need to explore 
all of these alternatives to make a critical observation: the need to 
pay for childcare is likely to change the utility of income curves of 
dual earners and single parents in ways that make it unrealistic to 
assume that these curves are identical across parenting models. 
This is, however, not the only reason why this assumption 
unravels—the need to pay for childcare is not the only critical 
difference between parenting models. Suppose, for instance, that 
Single Parent and the Dual Earners had managed to cobble together 
care with family, friends, and neighbors so that they did not end up 
incurring childcare costs (i.e., like the Sole Earners, C = 0 so that 
each family now has disposable income I).   
In this situation, does it become plausible to assume that utility 
of income curves are substantially similar? I argue that it does not, 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. This discussion exposes the limitations of the revealed preference view. Suppose 
that each of the hypothetical families spend C on childcare—Single and Duals do so during 
working hours and Soles do so for literally any possible reason one can imagine. The Soles’ 
expenditure reveals useful information about their preferences because they could have 
chosen to spend C on anything else they wanted. By contrast, the “decision” of Single and 
the Duals to spend C on childcare during working hours reveals little (if any) useful 
information about their actual preferences or the utility they derived from the expenditure. 
But a theorist that applied a revealed preference framework without recognizing these 
differences in opportunity sets would not have captured this distinction. This observation 
about the limitations of using a revealed preference view to understand differences in utility 
among parents will be reinforced throughout the remainder of the Section. 
 149. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, 
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993). 
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and the idea that parents that earn the same income will have 
similar choice sets (Statement 1, above) remains unrealistic. Aside 
from differences in actual costs incurred, a more general 
observation can be made. The time parents have to allocate among 
various life tasks—e.g., childcare, paid work, unpaid work, 
leisure—can be expected to differ (in some cases, significantly) 
among parenting models. While time constraints provide a “zero 
sum game” for all humans, the game is not even across families. I 
now turn to these “time gaps” and show how they are likely to 
change the utility of income for our three hypothetical families. 
2. Time gaps 
Most obviously, the “time gap” between single parents working 
full-time and sole earner families can be sizeable. The idea that 
single parents face different time constraints than two parent 
families is neither novel nor hard to grasp. As one expert puts it, 
“[t]he two key resources parents provide for their children are 
money and time.”150 But because “parental efforts to earn and 
provide money for their children [often] require time committed to 
paid labor,” time is a valuable commodity that has to be rationed.151 
As a result, because “[s]ingle-[parent] households . . . have similar 
time demands as married-parent households when children are 
present but half as many adults to provide family economic 
support and fulfill family caregiving needs,” they are more likely 
to experience “time deficit[s],”152 “severe time shortages,”153 and 
“time poverty.”154 
 
 150. Ronald E. Bulanda & Stephen Lippman, Wrinkles in Parental Time with Children: 
Work, Family Structure, and Gender, 13 MICH. FAM. REV. 5, 5 (2009). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Sarah M. Kendig & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Single, Cohabiting and Married Mothers’ 
Time with Children, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1228, 1229 (2008) (first citing S. Himmelweit, B. 
Bergmann, K. Green, R. Albeda & C. Koren, Dialogue: Lone Mothers: What Is To Be Done?, 10 
FEMINIST ECON. 237 (2004); then citing H. B. Presser, Can We Make Time for Children? The 
Economy, Work Schedules, and Child Care, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 523 (1989); and then citing C. 
Vickery, The Time-Poor: A New Look at Poverty, 12 J. HUM. RES. 27 (1977)); see also Melissa A. 
Milkie, Kei Nomaguchi & Scott Schieman, Time Deficits with Children: The Link to Parents’ 
Mental and Physical Health, 9 SOC’Y & MENTAL HEALTH 277 (2019). 
 153. Kendig & Bianchi, supra note 152, at 1228. 
 154. Andrew S. Harvey & Arun K. Mukhopadhyay, When Twenty-Four Hours Is Not 
Enough: Time Poverty of Working Parents, 82 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 57 (2007). 
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There is also evidence to suggest a significant time gap between 
sole earners and dual earners when full-time work is involved. 
Studies, for instance, suggest that the total combined workweek for 
dual-earning families is significantly longer than the workweek of 
sole-earning families.155 One study utilizing American Time Use 
data found that while only 40% of all couples (sole earners and dual 
earners combined) reported working over 80 hours or more, 60% of 
dual earners reported doing so.156 By contrast, less than 40% of sole 
earners reported working more than 50 hours a week.157 Future 
research could more fully explore the extent of the time gap 
between sole earners and dual earners. 
The general point, however, is as follows: single parents and 
dual earners can be expected to have (sometimes substantially) less 
time to allocate among life tasks than sole earners do. Where does 
this observation lead? At the outset, it is important to note that time 
gaps do not necessarily result in utility gaps. For instance, while the 
“zero sum” nature of time gaps may result in fewer preferences 
being satisfied among families with the same income, scenarios can 
be created in which foregone preferences are not particularly 
important (i.e., highly ranked) preferences.   
To illustrate, suppose our hypothetical families live in a country 
with plentiful jobs, and whose government provides free and 
accessible childcare of the highest quality, a mandated maximum 
workweek of twenty hours and a minimum wage that ensures a 
comfortable standard of living by even the most rigorous 
standards. Further, the residents of this country fervently espouse 
laissez-faire norms of parenting, in large part due to the freely 
available, world-class childcare at their disposal. Single Parents and 
the Dual Earners may still, given the finite nature of time, 
experience a time gap compared to the Sole Earners. 
But, because of governmental support structures and forgiving 
cultural norms, it is possible that time gaps do not significantly 
constrain choice sets and that utility gaps may not be particularly 
wide. In other words, despite time gaps, Single Parents and the 
Dual Earners may still be able to fulfill most of the preferences that 
 
 155. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 131, at 48. 
 156. Id. at 50. This suggests a much larger difference between dual and sole earners 
because dual earners were included in the latter category. 
 157. Id. at 50–51. 
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are important to them, and they may feel relatively happy and/or 
satisfied with the lives they are able to lead. 
America, however, differs from this hypothetical country in 
significant respects. And once relevant contextual factors are 
added, it becomes far more likely that time gaps will result in 
significant differences in choice sets and, thus, utility gaps between 
U.S. parents. I continue the discussion by more deeply exploring a 
concept introduced in the previous Section—that the amount of 
time parents have available to provide care for children will differ 
by parenting model. 
a. Time for parental care. Even if Single Parent and the Dual 
Earners manage to secure some type of non-paid arrangement that 
allows the child(ren) to be cared for during working hours, they are 
not in the same position as the Sole Earners who retain an available 
parent in the home.158 Their choice sets are different in crucial 
respects. As mentioned in the previous Part, compared to Single 
Parent and the Duals Earners (who must devote significant chunks 
of time to paid work), the Sole Earners seem to have more freedom 
to decide how much parental care their children will receive. And 
as discussed above, this likely implicates a very important (i.e., 
highly ranked) preference for most parents. 
But I now move beyond this point. The conversation has so far 
assumed that parents have the option to outsource childcare to paid 
providers. In truth, however, many American parents cannot 
afford to do so. Instead, as Joan Williams has explained, “‘[f]or most 
working-class families, child care is often patched together in ways 
that leave parents anxious and children in jeopardy.’”159 
Moreover, sometimes childcare cannot be outsourced at all, 
whether to paid or unpaid providers, because parental care is the 
 
 158. Studies have shown that employed mothers spend significantly less time with 
their children than non-employed mothers. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 131, at 62. They also 
suggest single mothers spend less total time with their children than married mothers, 
though more recent analysis concluded that differences could be largely eliminated after 
controlling for socioeconomic status and that once time was subcategorized, single mothers 
and married mothers provided similar time in “primary” care and only differed on time 
spent in “secondary” care. See generally Kendig & Bianchi, supra note 152, at 1228 (citing 
numerous studies on time use patterns of single parents and identifying potential concerns 
about a “widening gap between married and single mothers’ time investments in  
their children”). 
 159. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED: WHEN “OPTING 
OUT” IS NOT AN OPTION 10 (2006) (quoting LILLIAN RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE  
82–83 (1994)). 
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only feasible option. For instance, when a child falls ill, as children 
invariably do, usual childcare options may become unavailable 
(e.g., because the caregiver is unwilling to care for the sick child) or 
inappropriate (e.g., because the child is so sick that it is not safe for 
a non-parent to provide care). 
In these situations, the non–wage earner in the Sole Earner 
family can provide needed care while the wage earner draws 
income I as usual. But Single Parent and the Dual Earners do not 
have these same options. If parental care is required, parents in 
these families will often have to forego work. And for many 
American parents, this will also frequently result in lost income 
because their workplaces provide few accommodations.   
To provide some data points, the United States is the only 
country in the industrialized world that fails to mandate any paid 
parental leave.160 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
only 13% of private-sector workers in America had access to paid 
family leave in 2016.161 
Unlike many peer countries, the United States does not have 
broad mandatory paid sick leave either.162 In fact, the United States 
does not require that employers provide any paid sick leave to their 
employees, as the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) only requires 
12 weeks unpaid leave.163 But some parents cannot afford to take 
unpaid leave. 164 For example, evidence suggests “that mothers 
 
 160. Gretchen Livingston & Deja Thomas, Among Countries, Only U.S. Lacks Paid Parental 
Leave, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/12/16/u-s-lacks-mandated-paid-parental-leave/. 
 161. Employee Benefits Survey: Paid Sick Leave: Number of Annual Days by Service 
Requirement, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/ 
ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ownership/civilian/table35a.htm [https://perma.cc/ZHB8-AGSF]. 
 162. CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RSCH., United States Lags World in Paid Sick Days  
for Workers and Families, http://cepr.net/documents/publications/psd-summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QAR9-P667] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (reporting that of the twenty-two 
“rich countries,” the U.S. was the only country that did not require paid vacation time). 
 163. Sick Leave, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,  https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/ 
workhours/sickleave [https://perma.cc/Q8DS-VWNT] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020) 
(“Currently, there are no federal legal requirements for paid sick leave.”). 
 164. Ann P. Bartel, Soohyun Kim, Jaehyun Nam, Maya Rossin-Slater, Christopher 
Ruhm & Jane Waldfogel, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to and Use of Paid Family and 
Medical Leave: Evidence from Four Nationally Representative Datasets, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.: 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Jan. 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2019/article/racial-and-
ethnic-disparities-in-access-to-and-use-of-paid-family-and-medical-leave.htm (“[P]arents 
frequently do not take unpaid FMLA leave—even when they need to take time off to care 
for family members—because they cannot afford it.”). 
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from racial and ethnic minority groups, as well as less educated and 
unmarried mothers, are less likely to take unpaid leave such as that 
provided by the FMLA.”165 
Nor does the United States provide minimum paid vacation 
time, which is untrue of any other OECD member nation.166 Indeed, 
while all European Union member states are required to guarantee 
that all employees receive at least four weeks of paid vacation leave 
each year,167 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) recently found that 
nearly 25% of Americans working in the private sector do not 
receive any paid vacation time at all168 and that even after two 
decades of service the average American worker has only 20 days 
paid vacation available.169 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that “access to paid 
leave is not evenly distributed across the workforce.”170 For 
instance, one study concluded that “[w]orking parents with higher 
incomes and those who are non-Hispanic are significantly more 
likely to have access to any form of paid leave compared to low-
income or Latin[x] workers.”171 
 
 165. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 166. Rebecca Ray, Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, No-Vacation Nation Revisited, CTR. FOR 
ECON. POL’Y RSCH. 1 (2013), https://cepr.net/documents/no-vacation-update-2014-04.pdf 
(reporting that among the twenty-one “rich countries” identified by the Center of Economic 
Policy Research, the U.S. was the only country that did not require paid vacation time); see 
also Derek Thomas, The Only Advanced Country Without a Vacation Policy? It’s the U.S., 
ATLANTIC (July 2, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/the-
only-advanced-country-without-a-national-vacation-policy-its-the-us/259317/ 
[https://perma.cc/3NYN-MAPA] (“The United States is practically the only developed 
country in the world that doesn’t require companies to give their workers time off.”). 
 167. Working Conditions—Working Time Directive, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=205 
[https://perma.cc/7KER-JWPR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
 168. Private Industry Workers Received Average of 15 Paid Vacation Days After 5 Years of 
Service in 2017, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.: ECON. DAILY (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/private-industry-workers-received-average-of-15-
paid-vacation-days-after-5-years-of-service-in-2017.htm [https://perma.cc/LSG5-FTV4]. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Sarah Jane Glynn, Working Parents’ Lack of Access to Paid Leave and Workplace Flexibility, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 4 (Nov. 20, 2012),  https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/GlynnWorkingParents-1.pdf. 
 171. Id. (citing Sarah Jane Glynn & Jane Farrell, Latinos Least Likely to Have Paid Leave or 
Workplace Flexibility, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2012), https://cdn. 
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/GlynnLatinosPaidLeave1.pdf?_ga= 
2.187591278.734630241.1602781781-1704321206.1602781781. 
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Moreover, even if some leave is theoretically available, taking 
time off may carry other costs. It may even put the parent’s job in 
jeopardy. In a report entitled, One Sick Child Away from Being Fired: 
When “Opting Out” Is Not an Option,172 expert Joan Williams 
chronicles the plight of working parents who have been demoted 
and lost jobs as they struggled to balance the demands of inflexible 
work schedules and caregiving.  
Even if their job is not in jeopardy, many parents may rationally 
worry that taking time off to provide needed care compromises 
their reputation at work and flouts workplace expectations. This is 
especially likely to be true if the parent works in one of the many 
American workplaces that valorizes the “ideal worker.”173 As 
experts explain, the ideal worker norm that remains “alive and 
well” in America reflects the once-prevalent male breadwinner 
model.174 This ideal worker “works full[-]time and overtime and 
takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing.”175 (S)he 
is assumed to have another adult taking care of a disproportionate 
share of household tasks,176 so that (s)he is discharged not only of 
caretaking but also of most other domestic responsibilities. Taking 
too much time off of work to care for a sick child, therefore, may 
signal that a parent falls outside this ideal worker norm, possibly 
lowering his or her own assessment of her job performance as well 
as the views of her employer. 
All of the issues just described have been amplified during the 
COVID-19 pandemic where schools were shut down leaving 
parents with unanticipated and weighty burdens, including but not 
limited to homeschooling and providing care during the day.177 
 
 172. WILLIAMS, supra note 159. 
 173. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 (2000). 
 174. See supra Section I.A. 
 175. WILLIAMS, supra note 173. 
 176. Adrienne D. Davis, Straightening It Out: Joan Williams on Unbending Gender, 49 AM. 
U. L. REV. 823, 830 (2000) (“[T]he ideal worker is actually supported by the family work done 
by another adult. This distinction proves essential to why, although not all men can, do,  
or seek to perform as ideal workers, overwhelmingly it is only men who are capable of  
doing so . . . .”). 
 177. Claire Cain Miller, Nearly Half of Men Say They Do Most of the Home Schooling. 3 
Percent of Women Agree., N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2020/05/06/upshot/pandemic-chores-homeschooling-gender.html;  
Deb Perelman, In the Covid-19 Economy, You Can Have a Kid or a Job. You Can’t Have Both.,  
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While no doubt difficult for all families, the options available to sole 
earners differed dramatically from those available to dual earners 
and single parents. By definition, sole earners retained a partner 
that was not committed to external, paid work and could, therefore, 
typically take on the newly required care.178   
Dual earners and single parents did not have this safety net. At 
best, these parents were able to work from home and somehow 
balance the simultaneous demands made by children and their 
jobs.179 Many others, however, were not able to work from home. 
In particular, low-wage workers and Black and Hispanic workers 
were less likely to be able to work from home than others.180 One 
survey estimated that “[h]igher-wage workers [we]re six times as 
likely to be able to work from home as lower-wage workers.” It also 
estimated that “[l]ess than one in five black workers and roughly 
one in six Hispanic workers [we]re able to work from home.”181   
These disproportionate burdens were caused by many factors. 
Even before the pandemic, Black and Latinx workers reported less 
ability to “telework” than other workers.182 Furthermore, as the 
Center for Disease Control has explained, “[p]eople from some 
racial and ethnic minority groups are disproportionately 
represented in essential work settings such as healthcare facilities, 
farms, factories, grocery stores, and public transportation,”183 and 
were exempted from stay at home orders. 
 
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/business/covid-
economy-parents-kids-career-homeschooling.html; Douglas Clement, Jobs or Kids? Parenting 
During the Pandemic, FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2020/jobs-or-kids-parenting-during-the-
pandemic; Neil Paine & Amelia Thomson-Deveaux, How The Pandemic Could Force a 
Generation of Mothers Out of the Workforce, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 27, 2020), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-pandemic-could-force-a-generation-of-
mothers-out-of-the-workforce/. 
 178. See Miller, supra note 177. 
 179. See Clement, supra note 177. 
 180. Elise Gould & Heidi Shierholz, Not Everybody Can Work from Home: Black and 
Hispanic Workers Are Much Less Likely to Be Able to Work from Home, ECON. POL’Y INST.: 
WORKING ECON. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2020 1:15 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/black-and-
hispanic-workers-are-much-less-likely-to-be-able-to-work-from-home/. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See also Workers Who Could Work from Home, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (Sept. 24, 
2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/flex2.t01.htm. 
 183. Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html. 
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In sum, time gaps may result in significant differences in the 
amount of time parents can choose to care for their children. As a 
general matter, single parents and dual earners may have less 
ability to decide how much parental care their children receive, a 
preference that most will rank highly.184 And more specifically, 
when parental care is needed (i.e., cannot be outsourced), single 
parents and dual earners will generally have very different choice 
sets when compared to sole earners. Whereas sole earners can 
provide care without sacrificing income, dual earners and single 
parents may often have to forego income and may worry their job 
is at risk and/or their professional reputations compromised. 
Furthermore, parents of low socioeconomic status and certain racial 
and ethnic groups may have even more constrained choice sets 
than other similarly situated parents.   
These differences in choice sets can be expected to significantly 
change the utility different families can derive from income, further 
undermining the assumption that utility of income curves is similar 
among family models. Relatedly, time gaps may lead to utility gaps 
among parenting models because of differences in work aversion. 
b. Work aversion. Labor—the activity that allows many parents 
to earn income—is generally presumed to create at least some 
disutility.185 Disutility may result from the nature of the actual work 
and from the opportunity costs of working.186  
But the preceding discussion shows that the opportunity costs 
of working are different among parenting models. And as a result, 
work aversion can be expected to differ across parents too.187 For 
instance, as discussed, when dual earners and single parents work, 
they may be trading out time that their children can receive 
 
 184. Survey data and happiness studies may flesh these points out further. For instance, 
the Pew Research Center recently reported that “one-in-five full-time working moms say 
balancing the two is very difficult for them, compared with 12% of dads who work full time 
and 11% of moms who work part time.” PEW RESCH. CTR., RAISING KIDS AND RUNNING A 
HOUSEHOLD, supra note 28, at 5. 
 185. David A. Spencer, Love’s Labor’s Lost? The Disutility of Work and Work Avoidance in 
the Economic Analysis of Labor Supply, 61 REV. SOC. ECON. 235, 235 (2003) (“It has been 
routinely assumed within mainstream economics that work is a source of ‘disutility.’”). 
 186. Id. at 236. 
 187. See Fleurbaey & Maniquet, supra note 88, at 1074 (“Some workers may be more 
averse to work than others because . . . they have children or relatives needing care at 
home . . . .”); Shaviro, supra note 92, at 24 (noting that those with high work aversion will be 
affected particularly when labor decisions are lumpy); see also Sugin, supra note 15, at 234 
(noting “utility gains from substituting leisure for work”). 
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parental care. And for the many working-class families who have 
cobbled together childcare options, they may believe they are 
trading out their children’s safety as well. 
Studies also suggest that dual earners are able to spend less time 
with one another than sole earners and that this is not by choice but 
because of the time constraints imposed when both partners engage 
in external work.188 It also seems likely the amount of time available 
for leisure,189 often a source of utility, will differ by parenting 
model.190 These are just a few ways in which time gaps between 
parenting models may result in differences in the opportunity costs 
of paid labor. Yet it is already enough to show that work aversion 
is likely to vary among parents, further discrediting the idea that 
parents with the same income have similar choice sets and the 
assumption that utility of income curves are identical.  
Of course, some individuals may also experience utility from 
work. But once again, there are reasons to think that these benefits 
will differ across parenting models. 
3. The benefits of paid work 
Just as work can create disutility, it can also create utility.191 For 
instance, some individuals find their work provides them with 
meaning and a sense of purpose. This seems particularly likely 
 
 188. Sarah M. Flood & Katie R. Genadek, Time for Each Other: Work and Family 
Constraints Among Couples, 78 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 142, 160 (2016). 
 189. Leisure provides fertile ground for academic debates. Indeed, “leisure studies” is 
often identified as a separate branch of the social sciences. See Michael Silk, Jayne Caudwell 
& Heather Gibson, Views on Leisure Studies: Pasts, Presents & Future Possibilities?, 36 LEISURE 
STUD. 153, 153 (2017). There is, for instance, a vast literature debating what constitutes leisure 
in the first place. Id. 
 190. Nor is data particularly clear about how leisure differs among family models. As 
one scholar has put it: “Leisure time provides a measurable but understudied indicator of 
discretionary time, which has implications for social isolation, mental and physical health, 
and overall life satisfaction.” Joanna R. Pepin, Liana C. Sayer & Lynne M. Casper, Marital 
Status and Mothers’ Time Use: Childcare, Housework, Leisure, and Sleep, 55 DEMOGRAPHY 107, 
108 (2018). Existing studies have suggested that employed mothers enjoy less sleep and less 
leisure than non-employed mothers. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 131, at 89. Some have found 
that single parents have more overall leisure time than married parents, but researchers 
caution that one should not draw conclusions too quickly, as this leisure might be less 
restorative, more contaminated, more isolating, and more fragmented. Id. at 103. 
 191. See Warren S. Gramm, Labor, Work, and Leisure: Human Well-Being  
and Optimal Allocation of Time, 21 J. ECON. ISSUES 167, 168, 171 (1987), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00213624.1987.11504603. 
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among the class of workers who characterize themselves as having 
“careers” rather than “jobs.”192 
Non–wage earners in sole-earner couples will not derive this 
possible meaning from paid work (by definition they are not in the 
paid workforce). But, of course, they might derive utility from the 
nonpaid, internal work or other activities in which they engage 
instead. It is, however, likely that the utility derived from nonpaid, 
internal work and activities will differ from the utility derived from 
paid work, and this is the critical point this Part keeps making.   
To note a few other possible benefits of work, there is evidence 
that dual earners share more equally in nonpaid housework than 
sole-earner couples, which could result in divergence in joint 
utilities.193 It is also possible that dual earners more equally share 
discretion to choose how jointly earned income is spent whereas 
the non–wage earner in a sole-earner couple may enjoy less 
autonomy over spending decisions.194 
In response, one might counter that if the utility of engaging in 
paid work were to outweigh the benefits of not having time 
encumbered in the labor force, the non–wage earner in a sole-earner 
partnership might choose to enter the paid workforce. As discussed 
more below, the strength of this counter rests to a significant extent 
on the “lumpiness” of labor decisions. But for now, this discussion 
provides another category of reasons why the assumption that 
utility of income curves are identical across parenting models  
is untenable.195   
 
 192. See, e.g., Susan Levine, The Feminine Mystique at Fifty, 36 FRONTIERS: J. WOMEN 
STUD. 41, 41–46 (2015) (noting how author Betty Freidan called on women to find purpose 
by establishing careers, an argument that has now come to be criticized as classist since many 
women were already working to make ends meet and many cannot be expected to find such 
fulfillment in the work that is realistically possible for them). 
 193. See Suzanne M. Bianchi, Melissa A. Milkie, Liana C. Sayer & John P. Robinson, Is 
Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 SOC. FORCES 
191 (2000); Arnstein Aassve, Giulia Fuochi & Letizia Mencarini, Desperate Housework: Relative 
Resources, Time Availability, Economic Dependency, and Gender Ideology Across Europe, 35 J. FAM. 
ISSUES 1000, 1014 (2014); BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 131, at 92 (“[M]arried mothers . . . reduced 
the amount of housework they do so much that [by 2000] they d[id] almost as little 
housework as single mothers.”). 
 194. Kornhauser, supra note 149, at 88–89. 
 195. Finally, an observation about revealed preferences emerges that reinforces 
observations made in previous subparts—the actual behavior of the Soles reveals far more 
useful information about their preferences than the behavior of Single and the Duals, since 
the latter models lack critical choices. For instance, one may reasonably conclude that the 
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Before resting this case, I question the strength not only of  
that assumption (i.e., that the utility of income curves are identical 
among parents) but also of the assumption that the utility of  
income is strictly declining. Once this assumption is reexamined,  
the possibilities for extremely divergent curves becomes even  
more apparent.   
4. Friedman-Savage curve 
As Professor Sarah Lawsky puts it, “while some evidence 
supports” the general assumption of “declining marginal utility, 
other evidence also suggests some individuals actually experience 
increasing marginal utility, at least over some range of income.”196 
Professor Lawsky discusses the alternative Friedman-Savage 
curve, depicted below: 
Like the declining marginal utility curve, the Friedman-Savage 
curve has an intuitive story to tell:  
[T]he . . . segments with declining marginal utility . . . represent 
distinct classes, or “socioeconomic levels.” An increase in income 
 
amount of parental time the Soles devote to their children or the money or time they devote 
towards keeping their house a certain way reflects their preferences because one partner is 
not engaged in the workforce and thus available to make these choices. By stark contrast, 
little can be discerned about Single’s or the Duals’ preferences (when full-time hours are 
involved) just by looking at how time is allocated. But application of the revealed preference 
view would obscure these differences. 
 196. Lawsky, supra note 15, at 907–08. 
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that does not shift someone out of his class has diminishing 
marginal utility. The . . . section, with increasing marginal utility, 
represents the transition between the two classes.197 
Assume this story to be true and consider two alternative 
scenarios. First, suppose that all of our hypothetical families do 
have identical curves but that they are more like the curve pictured 
above than the traditionally assumed strictly declining curve. 
Suppose also that the spike in utility begins once one has disposable 
income S. In cases where the difference between childcare costs (C) 
and income (I) are less than S—that is, I – C < S—Single Earner and 
the Dual Earners may completely miss the utility surge that the Sole 
Earners enjoy.   
Now suppose that for myriad reasons discussed above that 
Single Earner and the Dual Earners have curves that are lower and 
flatter than the Sole Earners (e.g., because of childcare costs and 
time gaps) and that, additionally, they miss the utility spike just 
discussed.  If this true, the curves can be expected to diverge  
quite significantly. 
While these are just two possibilities, they are entirely realistic 
given this Section’s discussion. And it shows that once one relaxes 
the assumption that marginal utility of income is strictly declining 
and explore alternative curves like the Friedman-Savage curve, it 
becomes apparent how the utility of income curves of different 
families could diverge quite dramatically.198 
* * * 
This Section has identified numerous reasons why utility of 
income curves are likely to vary significantly across parenting 
models and developed at least two related reasons why this is true. 
First, parents using different models cannot be expected to have the 
same range of choices just because they earn the same income. And 
relatedly, income will not be an equally strong proxy of utility 
among parents.   
 
 197. Id. at 935–36 (footnotes omitted). 
 198. This Section has now identified myriad reasons why opportunity sets are likely to 
vary across parenting models and in doing so, has shown that the revealed preference view 
of utility lacks the descriptive value it might have in other contexts. I will not belabor this 
point further, except to restate one last time that application of this approach will yield 
questionable conclusions about the utility parents derive from a given level of income when 
parenting models differ. 
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Having made this case, I now outline the welfarist’s possible 
responses to this argument.  
C. Welfarist Responses 
There are several ways in which the welfarist might respond to 
the case just made above.   
First, she might refute it, arguing that utility of income curves 
won’t vary significantly and that it is still somehow likely that 
curves are substantially similar despite all the differences the 
previous Part has identified. Second, the welfarist might concede 
that there is no real sense of how curves differ across parenting 
models and that welfarism cannot currently offer much guidance 
about the taxation of parents. This might serve as a concession to 
allow other non-welfarist theories to govern or open the door for 
more meaningful engagement with empirical data (such as time use 
and happiness studies) to devise more realistic assumptions about 
the way in which utility of income differs among parents. Each of 
these debates would substantially enrich conversations about the 
taxation of parents. 
A third possibility is for the welfarist to continue to rely on the 
baseline assumptions so often used in legal tax literature—i.e., that 
the marginal utility of income is declining for all individuals and 
that all individuals enjoy the same utility from the same income—
without refuting the case made. The welfarist who does so should 
then acknowledge what normative or other non-welfarist 
judgments are driving that choice. For instance, a welfarist may 
prefer her function to be simple and be willing to sacrifice accuracy 
for it. But that is not a utilitarian justification; it is a practical choice 
to value one thing over another. Or she may think that we should 
assume utility curves are identical across parenting models because 
each parent has chosen their own lot. However, this view is not 
rooted in utilitarianism (which views utility as a fact about the 
world) but seems to reflect a normative judgment that people 
should bear the consequences of certain choices they make. 
The point of making this observation is not to criticize 
welfarism but to instead encourage more explicit discussion of 
what principles are being used. Going forward, if one were to offer 
a welfarist analysis concerning the taxation of parents and use the 
simplifying assumptions identified in Section II.B.1, she should 
explicitly identify the non-utilitarian choices driving that decision 
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and discuss the reasons for making those choices over 
other alternatives. 
Having clarified these parameters, I now sketch some of the 
possible prescriptive implications of Section III.C’s discussion.   
D. Prescriptive Implications 
a. Preliminary observations, predictable themes. As has been 
repeatedly stated, I have tried in this Article to show why utility of 
income curves can be expected to differ significantly among 
parents using different parenting models. I have not tried to 
undertake the task of identifying precisely how they might differ. 
Of course, to identify exactly what utilitarianism prescribes about 
the taxation of parents, one would need to make this determination. 
Nevertheless, given the preceding discussion, some preliminary 
observations remain possible and reveal a predictable theme: 
utilitarianism, once stripped of baseline assumptions, will often 
prescribe transfers away from those family models that have more 
constrained choice sets and are thus relatively inefficient at 
converting income into utility and towards those with more 
expansive choice sets who are more efficient utility converters. To 
illustrate, I sketch three possible ways in which utility of income 
curves might diverge among family models to see what 
utilitarianism would prescribe if future research were to confirm 
these scenarios to be accurate. 
First, using the discussion in Section III.C, consider a set of facts 
that show why some single parents and dual earners may have 
lower actual and marginal utility of income than their sole-earner 
counterparts. Suppose that Single Parent and the Dual Earners are 
in the common situation of believing that all earned income (I) is 
needed (i.e., they deem none of their income “discretionary”). 
Furthermore assume—as is often true for “[w]orking-class families 
[who routinely] face inflexible [work] schedules that conflict with 
family needs”199—that workplaces are not accommodating, and it 
is extremely difficult for these parents to miss days (or even hours) 
when caregiving emergencies arise. In economic parlance, the labor 
 
 199. WILLIAMS, supra note 159, at 3; see also Claudia Goldin, Hours Flexibility  
and the Gender Gap in Pay, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (April 2015), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/goldin/files/goldin_equalpay-cap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DKB7-TCTH]. 
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decisions of these families are very smooth—they cannot simply 
select how much they would like to work.200  
While at work and unable to provide care, assume the Dual 
Earners and Single Parent have cobbled together both paid and 
unpaid arrangements for their children. They do not feel 
comfortable with this care, believing it to be unstable and 
inconsistent, and as a result, experience disutility about these 
caregiving arrangements and have high work aversion. Finally, 
suppose each of the families have a utility of income curve that 
resembles the Friedman-Savage curve, but because of paid 
childcare expenses, Single Parent and the Dual Earners miss the 
“utility surge” the Sole Earners experience (a possibility sketched 
in Section II.C.3).   
In short, in this scenario—which may be particularly common 
for families in relatively low socioeconomic classes and of certain 
racial, demographic, and ethnic identities—the Sole Earners may 
derive much more utility from income I than Single Parent or the 
Dual Earners. And as a result, at this income level, utilitarianism 
would prescribe transfers away from Single Parent and the Dual 
Earners and towards the Sole Earners because that transfer will 
maximize utility. Utilitarianism, therefore, creates a case not only 
for preserving but possibly also strengthening the Code’s sole-
earner bias. These prescriptions run counter to the arguments often 
made in the legal tax scholarship for eliminating this preference 
and would end up enhancing the inequities that result from it.  
Next, consider how the choice sets of single parents and two-
parent families at a given level of income might diverge. Many of 
the differences just discussed will be amplified for solo parents, 
particularly when all income (and perhaps more) is needed. For 
instance, when parental care is required, the solo parent’s presence 
might be the only option. But because solo parents may not have 
another parent to “take turns” with, they may more quickly “use 
up” whatever accommodations their employers provide. Further, 
solo parents may often have even smoother labor decisions than 
dual earners, because they cannot scale back while the other parent 
scales up or otherwise toggle care and work.201 In other words, solo 
 
 200. WILLIAMS, supra note 159. 
 201. Penny Edgell Becker & Phyllis Moen, Scaling Back: Dual-Earner Couples’ Work-
Family Strategies, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 995, 995 (1999) (“[I]n some couples, husbands and 
wives trade family and career responsibilities over the life course.”). 
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parents may often have more constrained choice sets than two-
parent families. It is, therefore, quite feasible that solo parents have 
utility of income that is lower than that of two-parent families with 
the same earnings. To the extent this is true, utilitarianism will 
prescribe transfers away from single parents and towards two-parent 
families to maximize utility. 
This is not to imply the divergence (and attendant 
prescriptions) will always result in transfers to sole earners. Of 
course, scenarios could be created in which sole earners enjoy less 
utility from a given level of income than dual earners. Suppose, by 
contrast to the previous hypothetical, that dual earners have lumpy 
labor decisions—i.e., at least one partner has the power to decide 
how much (s)he will work.202 Suppose also that earners in the 
workforce are able to find deep meaning in their work while the 
non–wage earner in the sole-earner couple does not find similar 
meaning in the nonpaid activities in which (s)he engages. Assume 
finally that the dual earners share more equally in household labor 
and spending decisions. A story emerges where, at some income 
levels, dual earners might enjoy more utility from income than sole 
earners. To the extent this is true, utilitarianism would prescribe 
transfers towards dual earners and away from sole earners. These 
scenarios seem most likely at higher income levels. At the outset, 
the scenario depends on parents attaining a high enough income 
level that some income is deemed unneeded. And it is high earners 
that disproportionately enjoy the ability to find deep meaning from 
work and enjoy the flexibility to decide how much to work.203   
So while it not possible to make precise prescriptions without 
further empirical research, the above sketches begin to reveal two 
important points. First, utilitarianism, once stripped of baseline 
assumptions, may often prescribe transfers away from those family 
models that have more constrained choice sets and towards those 
with more expansive choice sets. And second, it will do so because 
some parents are better at converting income to utility than others.  
How one feels about these prescriptions depends on one’s 
theoretical devotions.  
 
 202. See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 199 (summarizing research on hours flexibility and part 
time options among work at different income levels); see also Shaviro, supra note 92, at 24 
(adding realistic assumption that labor market decisions are “lumpy”); McCaffery, supra  
note 4 (discussing incomplete markets in America). 
 203. Goldin, supra note 199, at 4. 
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b. So what? What comes next? Utilitarians will accept the 
prescriptions above as a necessary consequence of their frame. This 
is because they rely on a linear social welfare function and ask only 
that the sum of individual utilities be maximized. No room is left 
for other considerations.   
By contrast, even the nonutilitarian welfarist may not accept the 
prescriptions above. As discussed in Section II.A.2, many welfarists 
advocate for social welfare functions that incorporate non-welfarist 
principles, such as egalitarianism.204 This move is not heretical 
unless one conflates utilitarianism with welfarism—a mistake 
which seems to happen much more often in legal tax literature  
than elsewhere.205 
As pioneering scholar Louis Kaplow has long insisted, “[t]he 
chosen functional form implicitly indicates the weight given to 
equality.”206 And many scholars have now explored the idea of 
incorporating all sorts of non-welfarist principles into a welfarist 
analysis. Recently, for instance, Professor Marc Fleurbaey argued, 
“the traditional tool of welfare economics, the social welfare 
function framework, is flexible enough to incorporate many 
approaches, from egalitarianism to libertarianism.”207 Still other 
recent welfarist literature has argued that normative considerations 
might be incorporated into the definition of utility itself.208 This 
Article will not enter the thorny debate about the wisdom of these 
machinations. The key point here is as follows: those who continue 
to use welfarism to analyze the taxation of parents but that wish to 
push against the prescriptions above will have to turn to non-
welfarist principles to do so.  
 
 204. See Lawsky, supra note 15, at 914 (“Tax legal scholarship sometimes explicitly 
adopts or assumes a utilitarian social welfare function . . . .”). 
 205. Id. (legal tax scholars often “[do] not specify” the chosen social welfare function); 
KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 40 (“However, much work on taxation and other subjects in public 
economics is not seen primarily as posing the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency, 
and it is not generally conducted using this inclusive framework. There is tremendous 
variation in the extent to which existing work is deficient because of the failure to undertake 
explicit social welfare analysis.”) 
 206. KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 37. 
 207. Fleurbaey & Maniquet, supra note 88, at 1029. 
 208. I will not opine as to the point at which these ideas move a theory beyond 
welfarism entirely. Inasmuch as the aims of this Article are to open avenues for debate in the 
legal tax literature, this is irrelevant. What matters is that there is ample and unexplored 
room to debate the relative taxation of parenting models. 
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Of course, many other scholars are not committed solely to the 
welfarist frame. For them, Section III.D’s analysis may reveal the 
limitations of too heavily relying on welfarism to consider the 
taxation of parents. Indeed, some scholars may be less interested in 
the prescriptions themselves and more interested in the reasons 
behind them. Others will view the observations above as just one 
manifestation of utilitarianism’s general limitations.  
Recognizing that there remains room for non-welfarism 
principles for all but the utilitarian, I conclude this Article by 
situating the preceding analysis within the larger philosophical 
literature. I then sketch several non-welfarist theories that have 
received relatively little attention in legal tax scholarship and show 
how they could expand debates about the way parents are taxed.  
E. Beyond Utilitarianism and/or Welfarism  
I have, in this Section, attempted to show that opportunity sets 
are likely to differ across parenting models, resulting in different 
abilities to convert income into utility. I made these observations by 
exploring welfarism, the body of theories upon which I focused 
because of the consistent dominance they exert over distributive 
justice conversations in the legal tax literature. 
But the observations I have made should also be interesting to 
those committed to various non-welfarist theories, which receive 
less attention in legal tax scholarship. Even though one may not be 
committed to maximizing utility (the welfarist’s goal), she may 
remain interested in the observation that opportunity sets, and 
therefore the ability to convert income to utility, are likely to vary 
by parenting model. Many theorists care about utility. They just do 
not agree with welfarists that utility is the only object of interest or 
that it constitutes a complete measure of well-being. 
Nor do these theorists agree with the welfarist’s assertion that 
society should aim only to maximize total utility (or some function 
of it). As discussed, because of this goal, utilitarianism may often 
prescribe transfers away from certain parents because they have 
particularly constrained options. This specific observation 
illustrates a well-recognized critique of utilitarianism. The idea that 
individuals will not convert resources into utility with the same 
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efficiency is discussed widely in non-legal literature.209 What if, a 
common example asks, an individual with a physical disability 
finds it particularly difficult to derive utility from material goods? 
Utilitarianism may prescribe transfers away from the disabled 
individual to more efficient utility converters. In this way, critics 
argue, utilitarianism may deliver a double blow to the disabled 
individual—she already finds it difficult to produce utility and now 
she will have more resources taken away because of it. 
In response to this scenario, some non-welfarists argue that 
society should instead equalize opportunities,210 rather than 
maximize utility. Future work will delve more deeply into these 
distributive theories, but I conclude this Article by sketching three 
frameworks which develop the concept of equalizing 
opportunities—Richard Arneson’s opportunity for welfare 
approach, G.A. Cohen’s access to advantage approach, and 
Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach (developed in critical ways by 
Martha Nussbaum)211—and show how they could be used to 
substantially expand conversations about the taxation of parents.  
In developing his equality for welfare approach, Richard 
Arneson defines an opportunity as “a chance of getting a good if 
one seeks it” and believes that “equal opportunity for welfare . . . 
obtain[s] [when] . . .each [person] . . . face[s] an array of options that 
is equivalent to every other person’s in terms of the prospects for 
preference satisfaction that it offers.”212 Put more succinctly, 
individuals will have equal opportunities for welfare when they 
“face equivalent decision trees.”213 Arneson recognizes that it is not 
enough for an option to be technically available and insists that 
“[e]qual opportunity for welfare obtains [only] when all persons 
face effectively equivalent arrays of options.”214 This means (among 
other things) that there is an equivalent “ability to choose 
 
 209. Amartya Sen, supra note 99, at 204 (“[U]tilitarianism would compound his 
disadvantage by settling him with less income on top of lower efficiency in making utility 
out of income.”). 
 210. Richard Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD.: INT’L 
J. PHIL. ANALYTIC TRADITION 77, 77 (1989). 
 211. These theories could be used to guide the nonutilitarian welfarist in devising her 
social welfare function or be employed by the non-welfarist to supplant the welfarist analysis 
completely. More complete coverage reserved for future work. 
 212. Arneson, supra note 210, at 85. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 86. 
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reasonably among them.”215 Thus, for Arneson, “opportunity” does 
the work of recognizing differences in ability to convert resources 
(e.g., income) into wellbeing.216 While utilitarianism (once stripped 
of its unrealistic assumptions) supports the Code’s sole-earner bias 
because sole earners have more expansive opportunities than dual 
earners and single earners, Arneson’s opportunity for welfare 
approach might counsel the opposite—it would create a case 
against the sole-earner bias in favor of special benefits for those 
family models that have more limited choices.  
G.A. Cohen’s “access to advantage” approach offers similar 
prescriptions. Cohen’s approach is, by his own description, 
intended to be consistent with but broader than Arneson’s 
opportunity for welfare frame.217 To illustrate the difference, Cohen 
considers the situation of poorly situated individuals (e.g., the 
severely disabled) who may nevertheless be easily contented. For 
Cohen, “access” does the work of recognizing different abilities to 
transform resources into well-being. Differentiating opportunity 
from access, Cohen argues that the disabled individual may have 
the opportunity to do all sorts of activities (no one prohibits him 
from doing so) but that these options are not really accessible to 
him without additional accommodations.218 Cohen argues that 
“advantages” will encompass things that increase welfare but will 
also capture things that do not. For instance, Cohen maintains that 
the disabled individual may have the same welfare as an able-
bodied person because of his happy disposition. But he may have 
 
 215. Id. (“People might face an equivalent array of options as above yet differ in their 
awareness of these options, their ability to choose reasonably among them, and the strength 
of character that enables a person to persist in carrying out a chosen option.”). 
 216. This theory, therefore, seems to allow room to consider how opportunity sets 
differ by parenting model. As for the ultimate end-state to be measured, Arneson’s earlier 
work confined its focus to self-interest preference satisfaction (i.e., what a person prefers 
when pursuing her own advantage). Id. at 82. Like the welfarists’ view of utility (discussed 
in Section II.A.1), this may not account for parents’ ability to pursue goals for their children 
but that do not enhance (or even reduce) their personal well-being. However, Arneson’s later 
work articulates a more expansive view of well-being, which would measure “quality of life 
. . . [or] . . . level of wellbeing . . . with achievement of what is objectively worthwhile or 
choiceworthy in human life.” Richard Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, 110 
ETHICS 339, 341 (2000). This expanded conception of well-being is similar to that articulated 
by capability theorists (discussed in Section III.E) and would provide more room to theorize 
parenting models. 
 217. G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarianism, 99 ETHICS 906, 916 (July 1989). 
 218. This seems to run close to Arneson’s effective opportunities, but this need not be 
teased out here. 
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far fewer advantages.219 Like the “opportunity for welfare 
approach,” Cohen’s approach may create a case against the Code’s 
bias for sole earners who already enjoy greater access to advantage 
than other parents.  
Finally, Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach—at least as 
originally conceived—is neither an egalitarian theory nor a theory 
of social justice. Instead, the approach provides tools to compare 
the standards of living among individuals and communities.220 
According to Sen, standard of living should be understood by 
focusing “on what life we lead and what we can or cannot do, can 
or cannot be.”221 Life, he has famously put it, is about “doings” and 
“beings.”222 To fully assess standard of living, Sen would take stock 
of “functionings” and “capabilities.”223 Functionings are the 
“various living conditions we can or cannot achieve” while “our 
ability to achieve [these functionings] . . . [are] capabilities.” 224 For 
Sen, while functionings are actual “achievements,” capabilities “are 
notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what real opportunities 
you have regarding the life you may lead.”225 As Sen puts it, it is 
not enough to know that A and B would have both preferred their 
current state over all others. If A had no other choice but to live this 
way while B had a full range of options to choose from, Sen writes, 
“there is some loss in [A’s] living standard in this reduction  
of freedom.”226   
Like both Arneson’s “opportunity for welfare,” and Cohen’s 
“access to advantage” approaches, the capabilities approach could 
offer useful tools for more fully considering the way parents should 
be taxed.  
 
 219. Cohen, supra note 217, at 918, 930. 
 220. Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA  
OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Winter 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/win2016/entries/capability-approach [https://perma.cc/XC4Q-PD75] (“The 
capability approach is often wrongly taken to be an egalitarian theory or a theory of social 
or distributive justice.”). 
 221. Sen, supra note 121, at 23. 
 222. Id. at 39. 
 223. Id. at 23. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 48. 
 226. Id. at 49. 
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The Code taxes parents inequitably, undertaxing sole-earner 
couples compared to dual earners and single parents. Previous 
scholarship has identified the many inequities this creates and has 
argued for the elimination of this sole-earner bias. But scholars have 
often failed to connect their arguments with the distributive 
theories most invoked in legal tax literature to evaluate the wisdom 
of tax preferences. In this Article, the first in a series, I start drawing 
these connections by focusing on welfarist theories, which have 
exerted tremendous influence over tax debates.  
I show why welfarism, and in particular utilitarianism, may 
sometimes support the Code’s sole-earner bias despite the 
inequities it creates. And I also show how, more generally, it may 
favor parents who have relatively expansive opportunity sets and 
are, therefore, better positioned to use their income to achieve well-
being than other parents with fewer choices. I recognize that some 
will find these prescriptions counterintuitive and even troubling. 
For them, the analysis may reveal the limitations of relying too 
heavily on welfarism to analyze the taxation of parents. In light of 
this, I conclude by identifying other non-welfarist theories that 
have received less attention in the legal tax scholarship and 
discussing how they could expand conversations about how 
parents should be taxed relative to one another.   
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